Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 71031; Unpublished
Judges Brennan, Kelly, and Cook; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Serious Impairment of Body Function Definition (Cassidy Era – 1983-1986) [§3135(1)]
General Ability / Normal Life Element of Serious Impairment (Cassidy Era – 1983-1986) [§3135(1)]
Determining Serious Impairment of Body Function as a Matter of Law (Cassidy Era – 1983-1986) [§3135(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this short per curiam Opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court ruling that a seven-year-old child who sustained an aggravation of a mild stuttering problem after having been involved in an automobile accident, had not suffered serious impairment of body function. After undergoing an increase in speech therapy, the child was making good progress and had an excellent prognosis. In affirming the summary judgment, the Court stated that it did not want to "second guess" the trial court unless the Supreme Court provided more definitive guidelines. With regard to the standard of review on appeal, the Court stated, "we believe that an appropriate standard is that unless the trial court's ruling was clearly erroneous, we should affirm the findings of the trial court"
Judge Kelly concurred in the result but stated he was not satisfied with the "clearly erroneous" standard of review in serious impairment cases. He stated mat the clearly erroneous standard has been traditionally applied to appellate review of trial court findings of fact. Cassidy issues involved matters of law. Therefore, Judge Kelly stated, "I opt for a standard that would require both trial and appellate courts to view the undisputed facts in a light most favorable to the injured plaintiff and determine whether reasonable minds could differ on whether the impairment suffered is serious. . . . I would hold that reasonable minds could not differ on whether plaintiff’s injuries constitute serious impairment of a body function. Thus, I would likewise affirm the trial court's order of summary judgment"
