Michigan Supreme Court; Docket No. 69843; Published
Opinion by Justice Ryan; Unanimous
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 419 Mich 565; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
General Rule of Priority [§3114(1)]
Exception for Occupants [§3114(4)]
Exception to General Priority for Non-Occupants [§3115(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous Opinion by Justice Ryan regarding items number 768 and 753, the Supreme Court held that a wife who was struck in her garage by a vehicle driven by her husband and provided by his employer, should not be construed as an "occupant" of that vehicle for purposes of determining priority of benefits under §3114 and §3115 of the No-Fault Act In so holding, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals which had declared the wife to be an occupant of her husband's vehicle pursuant to the pre-no-fault case of Nickerson v Citizens Mutual. The Nickerson Opinion has been cited in numerous Court of Appeals decisions in support of a broad definition of occupant/occupying.
The Court ruled that the Nickerson rationale should not be utilized in defining the term "occupant" in §3114 and §3115. The Court stated that Nickerson is inapplicable for three reasons: 1) it is a pre-no-fault case which construes the terms of a private insurance contract rather than the language of the statute, 2) in Nickerson the term being construed was "occupying" which was expressly defined in the insurance policy which was the subject of that case, and 3) a broad definition of "occupying" in Nickerson was favored in order to insure coverage for an innocent victim. No such situation existed in the case at bar where the definition only affected the priority of payment between insurers rather than entitlement to the benefits.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court did not actually articulate a definition of the statutory term "occupant" as used in §3114 and §3115. Rather, the Court simply stated "whatever her status was after she left the motor vehicle in the street and walked some 60 feet to the rear of the garage where the Pontiac struck her, Mrs. Karam was 'not an occupant' of the vehicle when she was injured.''
Finally, the Court made it clear that it was confining its decision to the specific facts of the case. The Court stated, "whether in another case, on other facts, it will be appropriate to construe the meaning of the statutory term 'occupant' as used in §3114 and §3115 as including persons within and upon a motor vehicle as well as those entering into and alighting from it remains to be seen. It is certainly unnecessary, and indeed inappropriate for us to do so on the facts before us."
