Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 308291; Unpublished
Judges Owens, Murray, and Riordan; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Proof of Insurance [§3101b]
Out of State Accidents [§3111]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Motor Vehicle Code (Definition of Owner) (MCL 257.37) (MCL 257.401a)
Motor Vehicle Code (Registration and Title Requirements) (MCL 257.201, Et Seq.)
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam Opinion, the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff was not entitled to receive no-fault PIP benefits under MCL 500.3111 for injuries he sustained in an out-of-state accident while driving a vehicle he obtained from his mother because she was not considered an “owner” under MCL 500.3101(1).
The plaintiff in this case was a resident of Nevada. He was involved in an accident that occurred in the State of Nevada. At the time of the accident, he was driving a Lexis RX 330 that he obtained from his mother - who resided in Michigan and continued to maintain no-fault coverage on the vehicle. Plaintiff’s mother testified that she allowed him to borrow the vehicle, but that it was her intent that he would return it to her eventually. Plaintiff also testified that he understood he was only borrowing the vehicle and would have to eventually return it to his mother. Plaintiff was required to register the vehicle in order to lawfully drive it in the State of Nevada. To do so, he was further required to obtain a “Proof of Insurance” in Nevada. Plaintiff, therefore, asked his mother to send him the title to the Lexis so that he could register it in Nevada. His mother complied with his request and partially completed a Michigan Title Assignment - leaving the “date of sale” and the “sale price” lines of the Assignment blank. The vehicle was then registered in the State of Nevada and insured under a policy of insurance issued by State Farm. Plaintiff’s mother further testified that she informed her insurance agent that she had sent the vehicle to her son. At the time of the accident, the Michigan Secretary of State still listed the plaintiff’s mother as “holding title to the vehicle.”
The plaintiff sought to recover no-fault benefits under MCL 500.3111 arguing that “plaintiff was an occupant of a vehicle involved in the accident whose owner or registrant was insured under a personal protection insurance policy.” Defendant Home Owners, denied his claim, arguing that: (1) the insurance policy only provided PIP benefits when they were required by statute and PIP benefits were not required by statute in this case due to the fact that the vehicle was not required to be registered in the State of Michigan under the circumstances; and (2) that PIP benefits were not owed under the policy because plaintiff’s mother was not an “owner” of the Lexis as required to entitle plaintiff to benefits under MCL 500.3111.
The Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s first argument - that only mandatory PIP benefits were payable under the policy - finding this argument to be flawed for two reasons. In this regard, the court explained:
First, defendant’s premise—that the cited “policy language does not extend coverage beyond statutory requirements”—is based on an erroneous interpretation of the coverage provision. The phrase “subject to” means “subordinate” to and “governed or affected by.” Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed). In other words, the phrase is “introduc[ing] a subordinate provision,” indicating that the proposition set forth before the phrase can be superseded by a contrary provision in Chapter 31. Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage (3rd ed), p 616. Thus, if Chapter 31 does not override the provision, then coverage is owed if the conditions listed are satisfied. If defendant had meant the phrase to limit the scope of coverage to Chapter 31, it could have employed language to that effect, as it did in § 2(d)(1), where the policy references “any other insurance policy providing benefits under Chapter 31 of the Michigan Insurance Code” (emphasis added), and the Coordination of Personal Protection Insurance Benefits rider, § 3, where the policy references “the work loss benefits provided . . . in accordance with Chapter 31” (emphasis added).
Second, MCL 500.3101(1) provides in part: “The owner or registrant of a motor vehicle required to be registered in this state shall maintain security for payment of benefits under personal protection insurance, property protection insurance, and residual liability insurance.” Clearly, this statutory language limits the mandate that a vehicle owner or registrant maintain insurance to vehicles “required to be registered” in Michigan. But there is nothing in this language that precludes the owner to contract with an insurance company for “security for payment of benefits under personal protection insurance, property protection insurance, and residual liability insurance” not mandated by the statutory provision. Moreover, there is no language in Chapter 31 that clearly and unambiguously prohibits an individual with an insurable interest from purchasing personal protection insurance for a vehicle that is not required to be registered in Michigan because the owner is a nonresident. Although the Michigan Insurance Code clearly mandates personal protection insurance to be purchased in certain situations, it does not state that personal protection insurance cannot be purchased in other circumstances, such as those at issue in this case.
The Court then went on to hold that plaintiff’s mother was no longer an owner of the Lexis and, therefore, plaintiff was not entitled to receive PIP benefits under § 3111. In this regard, the Court reasoned that:
Although plaintiff and Ms. Carson testified that plaintiff was only borrowing the vehicle, “summary disposition cannot be avoided by a party’s conclusory assertions in an affidavit that conflict with the actual historical conduct of the party.” Bergan v Baker, 264 Mich App 376, 389; 691 NW2d 770 (2004). The only conduct that calls into question the intent to transfer is the fact that Ms. Carson continued to maintain her insurance policy covering the vehicle. Other objective and material evidence of the parties’ conduct, however, shows that even though the date of sale line was left blank, the parties intended to transfer title. Specifically, Ms. Carson signed the assignment of title as a seller and plaintiff signed it as the purchaser. Ms. Carson also listed herself as a new lien holder on the assignment of title. Thereafter, plaintiff used the assignment of title to secure a Nevada certificate of title, which listed plaintiff as the sole owner and Ms. Carson as merely a lien holder. Plaintiff also took out an insurance policy on the vehicle in Nevada. The lien release for the vehicle also listed plaintiff as the registered owner and Ms. Carson as the lien holder. Thus, even though the exact date that title was effectively transferred is not indicated on the assignment of title, it is clear that the parties intended to transfer title even though they left some spaces blank.1Accordingly, we conclude as a matter of law that Ms. Carson was not the “owner” of the vehicle under MCL 500.3101(2)(h)(ii).
The Court further rejected plaintiff’s argument that plaintiff’s mother could be imputed with ownership on the basis that she had use of the vehicle under MCL 500.3101(2)(h)(I). Specifically, the Court stated:
We reject plaintiff’s argument that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Ms. Carson was the owner of the vehicle based on having use of it. MCL 500.3101(2)(h)(i). Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, it is clear that Ms. Carson did not have use of the vehicle for a period greater than 30 days. The agreement between Ms. Carson and plaintiff certainly did not contemplate the immediate use of the vehicle by Ms. Carson, much less a use that would be greater than 30 days.
1 Additionally, we note that the assignment of title included a space for “date of sale” not “date of signature.” Accordingly, because this was not a sale, it is not clear whether the average nonsale transferor and transferee would even think to fill out this section of the form.
The Court, therefore, reversed the trial court’s denial of summary disposition requested by defendant Home Owners in the trial court below.
