Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 310916; Unpublished
Judges Gleicher, Saad, and Fort Hood; 2-1 (with Saad dissenting); Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
Link to Dissent
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Serious Impairment of Body Function Definition (McCormick Era: 2010 – present) [§3135(5)**]
General Ability / Normal Life Element of Serious Impairment (Kreiner Era: 1996-2010) [§3135(7)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unpublished 2-1 per curiam Opinion (with Judge Saad dissenting) the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition for the defendant on the issue of serious impairment of body function because a question of fact existed regarding whether the plaintiff’s injuries affected her general ability to lead her normal life.
The plaintiff in this case was struck from behind while stopped at a red light. The plaintiff did not seek treatment on the day of the accident and returned to work that day as a medical assistant. The next day, she went to the emergency room for treatment. She was prescribed multiple medications, physical therapy, and injections. Her doctor disabled her from employment. However, evidence was offered by the defendant that plaintiff subsequently performed licensed daycare services. Following the accident, the plaintiff needed a brace to walk. She was unable to perform major cleaning or perform household chores in the same manner as she had before the accident. She was further unable to enjoy going to the gym in the same manner as before the accident, and she could only use the steam room or do water exercises. Plaintiff was no longer able to get on the ground and play with her three grandchildren, and her travel was limited because she could not take long trips.
The defendant sought summary disposition on the basis that the plaintiff did not suffer a threshold injury under the McCormick standard. It was not disputed that plaintiff suffered an objectively manifested impairment to an important body function--only whether the impairment affected plaintiff’s general ability to lead her normal life. The court held, based on the record, presented, a question of fact existed on this issue and, therefore, reversed the trial court's grant of summary disposition for defendant. In this regard the court held:
"Plaintiff testified that she was disabled from working as a medical assistant. Her doctor provided an affidavit substantiating her contention. She was able to cook and clean before the accident. However, after the accident, she was unable to perform major cleaning or do laundry. For example, plaintiff could sweep a floor without carpeting, but could not push a vacuum. She was unable to shovel snow or perform yard work. Plaintiff needed a brace to walk. Although she admitted to attending the gym two to three times per month, the nature of her visits changed to using the steam room or water exercise. Plaintiff was no longer able to get on the ground and play with her three grandchildren, and her travel was limited because she could not take long trips. Accordingly, plaintiff testified that the accident caused an impairment that affected her general ability to lead her normal life."
The court further reasoned that the evidence the defendant relied upon in support of a contrary conclusion was lacking in many respects. The court explained:
“Moreover, we note that defendants merely submitted a document that evidenced plaintiff’s isolated payment of approximately $200 for daycare services. Defendants conclude that plaintiff’s daycare services were far more strenuous than her work as a medical assistant, and therefore, her general ability to lead a normal life was not impacted. This document lacks a foundation for such a conclusion. The payment of funds record contains no foundation regarding the type of services for which plaintiff received payment. Although defendants conclude that plaintiff obtained a more onerous and demanding job, this determination is not found in the record. Defendants did not depose plaintiff regarding the activity involved in her daycare operation, whether she had assistance, or the degree of supervision required in light of the age of the children. Moreover, defendants did not submit additional evidence of payment for daycare services. It is unclear if plaintiff obtained a license only to conclude that she was physically unable to provide daycare services and ceased her operations. Accordingly, the trial court erred by granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition in light of the conflicting evidence.”
Based on the foregoing, the court concluded that “[w]hether plaintiff can succeed at trial in light of the evidence presents an issue for the jury.”
Judge Saad dissented and would affirm the trial court’s grant of summary disposition "for the reasons set forth in the trial court’s well-reasoned, June 11, 2012, opinion."
