Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 84355; Published
Judges Gillis, T. M. Burns, and Hood; 2-1; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 155 Mich App 650; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Exclusion for Vehicles Considered Parked [§3106(1)]
Exclusion for Parked Vehicles Covered by Workers Comp [§3106(2)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this 2-1 per curiam Opinion, the Court of Appeals denied no-fault benefits to a truck mechanic who injured his back in the course of his employment when he was pulling up on a lever to release a pin which held the trailer box in place over the trailer axle. The purpose of releasing the pin was to permit the trailer box to slide over the axle so that the position of the wheels relative to the box could be changed. Sliding the trailer box back and forth would place the wheels closer to the front or closer to the back of the trailer. After the lever is pulled to release the pin, the trailer is moved by being pulled forward or pushed back by the tractor. While the box is being moved in this fashion, the wheels of the trailer are locked and remain stationary throughout the entire process.
The court denied no-fault benefits on the basis of §3106(2) which excludes from the receipt of no-fault benefits those workers who sustain injury in the course of their employment "while loading, unloading or doing mechanical work on a vehicle." The court held that in this case, the plaintiff was doing mechanical work on the vehicle and, in addition, the injury occurred "preparator" to the unloading process.
Initially, the court had to decide that the vehicle was "parked" in order for §3106(2) to apply. In holding that the vehicle was in fact parked, the court stated that the focus should be on the wheels of the trailer rather than the trailer box. At the time of the injury, the wheels of the trailer were locked by brakes and thus did not move during the procedure which led to the plaintiff’s injury. Therefore, the trailer was parked as that term is used in §3106. In holding that plaintiff’s injury occurred while he was "doing mechanical work" on the vehicle, the court held that it was immaterial that plaintiff was not repairing some mechanical defect. The court stated, “We believe that to distinguish on this basis would be both pointless and irrelevant to the language and purpose of §3106(2). Therefore, we conclude that a mechanic engaged in servicing a vehicle, whether he is engaged in repairing a defect, performing preventative maintenance or making an adjustment to alter operating characteristics, is performing mechanical work within the meaning of §3106(2)."
In holding that the injury also occurred during the "unloading process," the court stated, "Plaintiff admitted in his deposition that his purpose in pulling the lever which releases a pin holding the trailer axle in place was so that the trailer could be backed into the loading dock more easily. The purpose for backing into the dock was to either load or unload the trailer. Therefore, at the time of his injury, plaintiff was engaged in an activity preparatory to the actual procedure of loading or unloading goods from the trailer. Pursuant to Bell v FJBoutell (Item No. 830), this brings plaintiff’s injury within the contemplation of §3106(2)."
Finally, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that his iniury involved another moving vehicle (i.e., the tractor). The court stated that plaintiff’s back was injured when he pulled on the lever. Any movement of the tractor was absolutely irrelevant in causing the injury.
Judge T. M. Burns dissented. He would rely upon the decision in Marshall v Roadway Express (Item No. 881), and would find that plaintiff was not doing mechanical repair or maintenance work. He stated that the purpose of pulling the lever was to allow the trailer box to be repositioned over the axle so that it could be backed into the loading dock more easily. The plaintiff was not engaged in work normally performed by a mechanic for the purpose of repairing the vehicle. Judge Burns also disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the injury occurred during the "unloading process.” He would hold that the plaintiff’s action was "more properly considered as part of the delivery process than as part of the unloading process." He cautioned against a liberal definition of unloading where such a construction leads to the conclusion that the §3106(2) exclusion applies.
