Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 284994; Published
Judges Servitto, Bandstra, and Markey; 2-1 (Judge Markey dissenting)
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 287 Mich. App. 552, Link to Opinion 
The Michigan Supreme Court DENIED Leave to Appeal on 3/30/2011, Link to Order 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Obligations of an employer to provide earnings information [3158(1)]
Allowable expenses for home accommodations [3107(1)(a)]
Allowable Expenses: Causation Requirement [3107(1)(a)]
Work Loss Benefits: Calculation of Benefits [3107(1)(b)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this 2-1 published opinion authored by Judge Bandstra, the Court of Appeals held that even though the plaintiff’s former employer failed to provide a sworn statement of the plaintiff’s earnings as required by MCL 500.3158, the plaintiff was not precluded from receiving work loss benefits under MCL 500.3107(1)(b).
In this case, the trial court found that although plaintiff was not entitled to work loss benefits, it did find that plaintiff was entitled to reimbursement for housing expenses. In reversing, the Court of Appeals first found that although §3158 does require an employer to furnish a sworn statement regarding the plaintiff’s earnings, the statute does not provide that if an employer fails to provide such a statement, the claimant cannot collect wage loss benefits. In addition, the majority pointed out that there is no provision in the no-fault statute limiting the manner in which a claimant can prove his wage loss claim. It further stated that if the Legislature determined that public policy dictates that such a limitation should be imposed, it would be for the Legislature to impose, not the court. In this regard, the court stated:
“MCL 500.3158(1) does not require an employer to furnish a sworn statement regarding the earnings of an injured person but nowhere does it state that, if such information is not provided, an injured person completely loses the right to work loss benefits under MCL 500.3107(1)(b). The dissent would penalize plaintiff for his former employer’s failure to comply with MCL 500.3158 even though that statutory provision says nothing about employees and only places a responsibility on employers. . . . However, imposing such a penalty would be a public policy decision for the Legislature, not the court. Nowhere do the statutes suggest that MCL 500.3158(1) is the only manner in which a wage loss claim may be proved or that MCL 500.3107(1)(b)’s right to a wage loss claim hinges on compliance with MCL 500.3158(1). We are not free to read something into the statute that does not exist, no matter how egregious the facts may be.”
The court then reversed the housing reimbursement award, citing Griffith v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 472 Mich 521; 697 NW2d 895 (2005). Based on the Supreme Court’s analysis in Griffith, the Court of Appeals determined that the claimant’s housing costs are only compensable if they are greater than the costs the claimant incurred for housing before the accident and that the claimant’s housing needs are different from an injured person’s housing needs. In this regard, the court stated:
“Under the Griffith analysis, plaintiff’s housing costs are only compensable to the extent that those costs became greater as a result of the accident. . . . Plaintiff must show that his housing expenses are different from those of an uninjured person, for example, by showing that the rental cost for handicapped accessible housing is higher than the rental cost of ordinary housing. In the absence of that kind of factual record, the trial court erred in concluding that plaintiff was entitled to housing costs compensation merely on the basis of the amount plaintiff was currently paying in rental income, for a residence that the record does not even demonstrate was handicapped accessible.”
