Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 80570; Published
Judges Wahls, Allen, and Ravitz; 2-1; Per Curiam (with Judge Ravitz Dissenting)
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 146 Mich App 619; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Serious Impairment of Body Function Definition (Cassidy Era – 1983-1986) [§3135(1)]
Objective Manifestation Element of Serious Impairment (Cassidy Era – 1983-1986) [§3135(1)]
Important Body Function Element of Serious Impairment (Cassidy Era – 1983-1986) [§3135(1)]
General Ability / Normal Life Element of Serious Impairment (Cassidy Era – 1983-1986) [§3135(1)]
Determining Serious Impairment of Body Function as a Matter of Law (Cassidy Era – 1983-1986) [§3135(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this 2-1 per curiam Opinion with Judge Ravitz dissenting, the Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff’s claim that her soft tissue back injury and subsequent psychiatric disability constituted serious impairment of body function.
Plaintiff began experiencing back problems after being involved in an automobile accident in November of 1979. She had difficulty with certain activities such as walking a couple of miles, driving, sitting and sleeping. Plaintiff testified that despite the pain, she was able to perform almost all of the activities she was capable of performing before the accident. Plaintiff also experienced psychological problems which are manifested in feelings of anger because of time lost due to her physical injuries. A medical doctor examined plaintiff and found no objective evidence of any traumatic or orthopedic pathology to account for her physical complaints. In addition, plaintiff was examined by defendant's consulting psychiatrist who diagnosed a "post-traumatic neurosis," which may be associated with some type of bodily injury or mental injury. The psychiatrist believed that the neurosis was temporary and would subside in a short period of time if plaintiff received psychiatric treatment.
In ruling that the plaintiff had not established a threshold injury, the court did point out, "We have no trouble concluding that the functioning of the mindrepresents an important body function." However, plaintiff’s injuries did not seriously impair mat body function, nor were they objectively manifested. The majority concluded, "Assuming that plaintiff did suffer a back injury and post-traumatic neurosis, it has not been established that such injuries significantly interfered with her normal activities."
Judge Ravitz dissented on the basis that a material question of fact existed entitling plaintiff to jury trial. Judge Ravitz took issue with the majority's conclusion that plaintiff’s injuries did not affect her ability to lead a normal life. He noted that defendant's psychiatrist confirmed the fact that plaintiff was suffering from a neurosis which was temporarily disabling. Judge Ravitz also disagreed with the majority's view that plaintiff’s injuries were not objectively manifested. He wrote:
"The majority cites Williams v Payne (Item No. 708) in which a panel of this court held that in order for an injury to be objectively manifested, it must be capable of medical measurement.' The ‘medical measurement’ test espoused in Williams is a convenient method for reducing litigation in automobile cases. However, it is not rationally related to the Legislature's goal of preventing over-compensation for minor injuries. Soft tissue injuries and psychiatric trauma are difficult or impossible to measure medically. Yet, persons who suffer with these injuries for years would certainly gladly trade places with those who suffer a badly fractured bone and are incapacitated for 6 or 7 months, but who thereafter are able to lead perfectly normal lives. . . . The doctor's abilities to diagnose
based on these assertions should satisfy the objective manifestation requirement announced in Cassidy. To deny recovery because such injuries are not capable of 'medical measurement' denies compensation to a large class of individuals who suffer a greatly reduced quality of life as a result of automobile accidents. Clearly, the Legislature did not intend such an arbitrary hurdle as that imposed by the 'medical measuremenf test"
