Michigan Supreme Court; Docket No. 72861; Published
Opinion by Justice Boyle (in Part) and Justice Levin (in Part)
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 422 Mich 594; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Not Applicable
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Extra Contractual / Mental Anguish Damages
CASE SUMMARY:
This case is an appeal from Item No. 707. The case involves two issues: (1) Whether the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress exists in Michigan, and, if so; (2) whether plaintiff’s adequately pled and proved this tort.
In the majority opinion written by Justice Boyle, joined by Justices Ryan, Brickley, Cavanagh and Riley, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that plaintiff failed to meet the threshold requirements of proof to make out a prima facie claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In light of that failure, the court did not reach the issue "as to whether this modern tort should be formally adopted into the jurisprudence of Michigan...."
This lawsuit arose out of the failure of Auto-Owners Insurance Company to pay replacement service benefits under §3107(b) of the statute. At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for the replacement service benefits, as well as for mental anguish damages caused by the defendant's intentional infliction of emotional distress. In pursuing this tort, plaintiff relied on three basic facts: (1) Defendant's failure to supply plaintiff with a form for claiming replacement service benefits; (2) defendants delay in responding to the claim for replacement services (roughly six months after the accident and two months after plaintiff’s created and submitted their own documents claiming 'replacement benefits); and (3) defendant's apparent denial of the replacement benefits claim.
The majority opinion stated that those states which have recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress have generally embraced §46 of the Restatement of Torts, 2d, as defining the parameters of this cause of action. The Restatement states in part:
"One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm."
After quoting Restatement, the majority opinion then stated that four elements are identified in this definition and presumably required for recovery: (1) Extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) intent or recklessness; (3) causation; and (4) severe emotional distress.
The majority held that plaintiffs failed to meet the minimum proof requirements by showing either "extreme and outrageous" conduct or "severe emotional distress." The court stated that the conduct necessary to establish this tort must be so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable is a civilized community. Liability under this cause of action does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions or other trivialities. In a contractual setting, the court stated that the cause of action must rest on a breach of duty distinct from the contract.
However, the court was careful to point out that "the foregoing principles do not preclude recovery for an insurer's intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, our continued adherence to these precepts combined with the observations noted in the Restatement comments, significantly limits the range of circumstances in which a prima facie showing of outrageousness can be made in the insurance context. The mere failure to pay a contractual obligation, without more, will not amount to outrageous conduct for the purposes of this tort.... In addition, an insurer's request for verification of claims, in the absence of evidence of harassment or similarly egregious conduct, falls short of conduct which we would consider 'tortiously outrageous.'"
In assessing the inadequate evidence presented in this case, the court made the following observation; "While Auto-Owners' conduct is hardly praiseworthy, plaintiff’s allege no more than the failure of Auto-Owners to facilitate the filing of a replacement services claim, a delay of at most six months in responding to the claim as filed, and the denial of benefits owed. Such conduct may properly be considered unreasonable for purposes of assessing the statutory penalty for overdue payments, as well as plaintiffs' attorney fees against Auto-Owners. However, the record evidence falls far short of the conduct which is considered tortiously outrageous. Although anger may be an indicia of emotional distress, the reaction testified to does not even approach the level of emotional distress contemplated by the Restatement drafters in requiring that 'no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.' Rather, plaintiffs' anger is more consistent with that which normally accompanies the breach of a contractual obligation. There was no evidence of grief, depression, disruption of lifestyle or of treatment for anxiety or depression. The distress proved by plaintiffs was, as a matter of law, insufficient to support this cause of action."
Chief Justice Williams, concurring, would recognize the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in Michigan. Justice Levin also wrote separately and questioned whether recognition of another cause of action is the most efficacious way of addressing the problem of unjustified litigation. He felt that the creation of a new cause of action would increase the burden of litigation. Justice Levin suggested that the provisions in the new court rules for imposition of sanctions for unjustified litigation should be expanded to provide compensation for all pecuniary loss resulting from unjustified claims or unjustified claim defenses.
