Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 95489; Unpublished
Judges Beasley, MacKenzie, and Hathaway; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Standards for Deductibility of State and Federal Governmental Benefits [§3109(1)]
Veterans / Military Benefits [§3109(1)]
Determination of Domicile [§3114(1)]
PIP Benefits Payable as Loss Accrues [§3142(1)]
Reasonable Proof Standard [§3142(1)]
Requirement That Benefits Were Unreasonably Delayed or Denied [§3148(1)]
Conduct Establishing Unreasonable Delay or Denial [§3148]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous Opinion dealing with a claim for no-fault benefits filed by a military serviceman, the court rendered the following holdings:
1. A serviceman does not lose his status as a domicile of his parent’s residence simply by joining the military. Questions of domicile are decided by a review of several factors. According to previous decisions in Workman v DAIIE, 404 Mich 477 (1979), Dairyland v Auto-Owners, 123 Mich App 675 (1983) and Bryant v Safeco, 143 Mich App 743 (1985), the courts have considered such factors as the subjective or declared intent of the claimant, the formality or informality of the relationship between household members, whether the alleged domicile is on the same curtilage as the place of residence, the existence of other places of residence, whether the claimant continues to use his parents home as a mailing address, whether the claimant maintains possessions ai his parents address, whether the claimant uses his parents address on a driver's license or other documents, whether a room is maintained for claimant at the parents home, whether claimant is dependent upon his parents for support, etc. In this case, ample evidence existed to conclude that plaintiff’s domicile was the residence of his parents prior to joining the military.
2. In light of the fact that this was a "priority dispute" between two insurers, it should not have been necessary for plaintiff to file and maintain litigation in order to recover benefits. Citing Darnell v Auto-Owners, 142 Mich App 1 (1985), the court stated "problems of priority among insurers should not cause delay in payment of benefits to which the claimant is entitled. Rather, priority claims should be handled by paying the insured and having the insurance companies thereafter dispute their liabilities in an action of subrogation." In light of Darnell, supra, the trial court's finding of unreasonable delay in payment of benefits was not clearly erroneous and, thus, the award of attorney fees to plaintiff was proper.
3. An award of interest under §3142 accrues 30 days after an insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and the amount of the loss. Reasonable proof is not, however, commensurate with receipt of a standard application for benefits.
4. The trial court was correct in setting off military medical benefits received by plaintiff from the United States Government as a member of the Armed Services. The court relied on the Supreme Court's opinion in Crowley v DAIIE, 428 Mich 270 (1987), which held that medical care provided a member of the Armed Services is a benefit provided under the laws of the federal government and is therefore required to be subtracted from no-fault medical benefits otherwise payable where neither the insured person, his spouse, nor a relative domiciled within the same household owns an automobile insured under the No-Fault Act.
