Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #311513; Unpublished
Judges M.J. Kelly, Cavanagh, and Shapiro; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Determination of Domicile [§3114(1)]
Resident Relatives [§3114(1)]
Separated and Divorced Spouses [§3114(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam Opinion regarding plaintiff’s domicile, the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff was domiciled with his mother as a matter of law because a court order was issued prior to the accident “indicating that, as a matter of law, [the plaintiff] was domiciled with his mother.”
The plaintiff in this case was a minor child of divorced parents who was injured in an automobile accident and suffered injuries to his shoulder and head. Prior to the accident the plaintiff’s mother obtained a default judgment of divorce, which “provided that plaintiff’s mother ‘is awarded the care, custody, maintenance and education’ of the plaintiff.” At the time of the accident, plaintiff lived with his half-sister in a home owned by his mother that was located in Detroit. However, his mother lived in a separate home located in Grand Blanc. Evidence was offered that plaintiff’s mother spent two or three weekends per month at the Detroit home with the plaintiff. After the accident, the plaintiff made a claim for PIP benefits under his mother’s Titan insurance policy, contending that he was “a relative . . . domiciled in the same household” under MCL 500.3114(1). Titan denied the claim, and the plaintiff later filed suit. Summary disposition was granted in favor of defendant by the trial court on the basis that "plaintiff was not domiciled with his mother."
After the trial court granted summary disposition in defendant’s favor, the Supreme Court decided the case of Grange Ins Co of Mich v Lawrence, 494 Mich 475 (2013), where the Court held that a “custody order is . . . determinative of the child’s domicile for all purposes, including the no-fault act.”
Applying the Supreme Court’s holding in Grange, the Court of Appeals held based on the existence of the default Judgment of Divorce that that the plaintiff was domiciled with his mother as a matter of law. In this regard, the court held:
“At oral argument in the instant matter, plaintiff presented this Court with a default judgment of divorce, dated October 21, 1993 and requested that we take judicial notice of it. That judgment provided that plaintiff’s mother “is awarded the care, custody, maintenance and education of” plaintiff.
Absent subsequent changes to that custody order, we would conclude, consistent with Grange, that on the date of the accident plaintiff was domiciled with his mother as a matter of law for purposes of MCL 500.3114(1).”
The court, therefore, remanded the case for further proceedings below. However in doing so, the Court noted that the “defendant remains entitled to challenge the authenticity of the judgment and to introduce any subsequent orders modifying that judgment.”
