Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 97427; Published
Judges Hood, Maher, and Sullivan; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 167 Mich App 238; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Disqualification for Uninsured Owners or Registrants of Involved Motor Vehicles or Motorcycles [§3113(b)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous per curiam Opinion, the Court of Appeals interpreted the provisions of §3113(b) which preclude an injured party from receiving personal protection insurance benefits where that person is the owner or registrant of an uninsured motor vehicle "involved in the accident." The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling that plaintiff was entitled to benefits for injuries suffered while pushing his uninsured vehicle on the road.
It was undisputed that plaintiff was driving his uninsured vehicle when it ran out of gas. While plaintiff coasted on the road, an oil tanker came behind plaintiff in the same lane, and both vehicles stopped for a red light. Plaintiff then exited his vehicle for the purpose of pushing it off the road and onto a side street. He was actually pushing his vehicle on the road when the light turned green. The oil tanker then accelerated and struck the rear-end of plaintiff’s moving vehicle. This impact knocked plaintiff down to the ground, and plaintiff’s vehicle continued down the street. The tanker then drove over plaintiff’s right leg. A claim was made from League General under an insurance policy issued to plaintiff’s father-in-law with whom plaintiff was a resident relative. Claim was also made against the insurer for the tanker. League General disputed coverage on the basis that plaintiff was barred by the provisions of §3113(b) because his uninsured vehicle was involved in the accident.
On appeal from the trial court's ruling in favor of plaintiff, the court held that plaintiff’s uninsured vehicle was "involved in the accident," thereby precluding benefits. The court rejected the claim that plaintiff’s uninsured vehicle was "parked," thus rendering the parked vehicle provisions of §3106 inapplicable. The court stated that "logic dictates that a moving vehicle is not parked."
Quoting from Stonewall Insurance v Farmers (Item No. 669), the court stated that the claimant's car has to be an active link in the chain of circumstances, as opposed to a passive link for the vehicle to be "involved in the accident." Here, plaintiff contended that his car did not contribute to the happening of the accident, but rather, the sole cause was the oil tanker driver's inattentiveness. However, the Court of Appeals held in this case that plaintiff’s car was an "active link" in the chain of circumstances causing the oil tanker to drive over his leg. Thus, plaintiff’s uninsured vehicle was "involved in the accident," thereby disqualifying him from no-fault benefits.
The court also noted that a similar issue had been addressed in the Supreme Court case of Heard v State Farm Insurance (Item No. 538), where it was held that an insured claimant's car was not involved in the accident. In that case, plaintiff was injured while pumping gas at a service station into his stationary uninsured vehicle. The Supreme Court held in Heard, supra, that the mere presence of a "causal relationship" does not resolve the question of whether a vehicle is "involved" for purposes of the No-Fault Act. In Heard, the court held that the vehicle was not in use as a motor vehicle, but was more like any other stationary roadside object that can be involved in accidents. On this basis, no-fault benefits were permitted.
