Michigan Court of Appeals Docket No 94012; Published
Judges Beasley, Hood, and Borradaile; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 164 Mich App 66; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Exclusion for Parked Vehicles Covered by Workers Comp [§3106(2)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Workers Disability Compensation Act (MCL 418.1, et seq.)
CASE SUMMARY:
This unanimous per curiam Opinion deals with the parked vehicle, loading/loading and mechanical work provisions of §3106(2) of the Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that plaintiff was entitled to receive no-fault benefits despite defendant's claim that he was involved in the process of either unloading or doing mechanical work on a vehicle.
Plaintiff in this case was an inter-city truck driver for United Parcel Service (UPS). He was insured on May 7, 1983, while in the process of disengaging his tractor from its loaded trailer Plaintiff backed the trailer up to a security door, lowered its support legs, and released the air and electrical connections between the trailer and tractor. Plaintiff’s job did not involve unloading the trailer, and that would be performed by other employees. While dismounting from his tractor, plaintiff stepped on one of the fuel tanks, slipped and injured his back.
Defendant was voluntarily paying plaintiff workers' compensation benefits due to the injury. Defendant argued in response to plaintiff’s claim for no-fault benefits that the provisions of §3106(2) precluded plaintiff from receiving no-fault benefits because he was engaged in unloading a parked vehicle. Alternatively, the defendant contended that plaintiff was "doing mechanical work on the vehicle."
The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of plaintiff’s claim, and relied upon the decision in Marshall v Roadway Express (Item No. 881). The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, noting a "seeming conflict" between Marshall and McDonald v Michigan Mutual (Item No. 924). The Court of Appeals found the Marshall case to be controlling, and agreed with the dissent in McDonald that "plaintiff’s action in this case more properly considered as a part of the delivery process than as a part of the unloading process. The legislative intent of §3106(2) was to preclude 'double recovery' permitted by the prior §3106 where dock workers, warehouse workers and mechanics was able to collect both workers' compensation and no-fault benefits, though they never operated a motor vehicle" The Court of Appeals found this legislative intent entirely different when it relates to the "actual operator of a motor vehicle" as is found in this case. The court also rejected defendant's argument that the plaintiff was "doing mechanical work" which would also preclude coverage. The court cited from the Marshall case, which defined the term "doing mechanical work" as "work normally done by a mechanic which is for the purpose of maintaining or repairing the vehicle."
