Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 92838; Unpublished
Judges Beasley, Hood, and Borradaile; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Work Loss Benefits: Nature of the Benefit [§3107(1)(b)]
Work Loss Benefits: Loss of Earning Capacity [§3107(1)(b)]
Standards for Deductibility of State and Federal Governmental Benefits [§3109(1)]
Other Benefits [§3109(1)]
One-Year Notice Rule Limitation [§3145(1)]
Required Content of Notice / Sufficiency of Notice [§3145(1)]
General / Miscellaneous [§3145]
Requirement That Benefits Were Unreasonably Delayed or Denied [§3148(1)]
Conduct Establishing Unreasonable Delay or Denial [§3148]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous per curiam Opinion involving a case that has been up and down the appellate ladder a couple of times, the Court of Appeals made several holdings regarding no-fault work loss benefits and recovery of attorney fees for unreasonable refusal to pay those benefits. Included in the Court's holding were the following:
1. First, the one year statute of limitations contained in §3145(1) and the notice requirement contained therein, are satisfied when plaintiff’s no-fault insurer receives a letter demanding uninsured motorist benefits where the letter contains the statutorily required items of information even though the letter does not formally request payment of no-fault PIP benefits. In so holding, the Court stated, "In alleging that plaintiff’s claim for PIP benefits was barred, defendant confuses 'notice of injury' with 'notice of personal protection claim.' The language of the statute requires written notice of the injury, which includes plaintiff s. name, address, and the time, place and nature of the injury. We find that plaintiff’s November 25,1975 letter complied with the statutory notice requirement"
2. Second, the Court held that defendant insurance company waives a statute of limitation defense under §3145 where the defendant failed to raise the defense in its first responsive pleading. In so holding, the Court cited Butler v DAIIE (Item No 583) and Liddell v DAIIE (Item No 380).
3. Third, the Court held that plaintiff was entitled to collect no-fault work loss benefits under §3107(b) even though plaintiff was unemployed at the time of the accident where the facts showed that plaintiff had made definitive arrangements to begin a new job the month after the accident occurred. In so holding, the Court stated, "Under these facts, the award was proper had plaintiff not been injured in the auto accident, the evidence showed that he would have begun work at Landark Dry Wall in September, 1987. This work was not speculative, as both plaintiff and his prospective employer had agreed on the date he would start. As the statute provides work loss benefits to compensate for the loss of income a claimant would have received if he had not been injured, the trial court's award was appropriate." The proofs were thus sufficiently specific so that this was not a claim for loss of earning capacity.
4. Fourth, under the specific facts of this case, the Court held that plaintiff’s unemployment benefits could not properly be setoff against no-fault work loss
benefits under §3109(1) for the reason that these benefits were not "provided or required to be provided as a result of the automobile accident" as is required by the two-prong test set forth in Jarosz v DAIIE (Item No. 702).5. Finally, the Court affirmed an award of attorney fees under §3148( 1) in the amount of $49,400 for defendant's unreasonable refusal to pay a work loss claim in the amount of $8,233.23. The Court noted that two practicing attorneys testified as expert witnesses at a special hearing on the issue of attorney fees, and oth had testified that the defendant had unreasonably refused to pay the claim. addition the Court noted that the defendant had prolonged the case for nine nd one-half years "as it pursued merit less claims and defenses," including an rgument that plaintiff was not entitled to recover judgment interest part of his claim. The Court noted that a trial court's award of attorney fees will not be reversed on appeal unless it is "clearly erroneous." After thoroughly reviewing the record, the Court of Appeals was unable to find such error.
