Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #304622; Published
Judges Cavanagh, P.J., Sawyer, and Saad; Unanimous; Per Curiam;
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Forthcoming; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Entitlement to PIP Benefits: Motor Vehicle Involvement [§3105(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous published per curiam Opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s Judgment in favor of plaintiff, Detroit Medical Center, on the issue of whether its patient was entitled to no-fault benefits for injuries sustained when the person was traveling up to 100 mph on a motorcycle and swerved and fell off because he was not be able to see due to the bright headlights from an approaching motor vehicle. The Court of Appeals ultimately reasoned that it could not find a sufficient causal connection between the motorcyclist’s injuries and the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle sufficient to trigger entitlement to no-fault benefits under MCL 500.3105(1).
The injured person in this case was traveling upwards of 100 mph on a dark and deserted side street. The person claimed to see bright headlights from an approaching motor vehicle that turned onto the street. The person applied the brakes on the motorcycle to avoid colliding with the vehicle, causing the motorcycle to fishtail and swerve. The person then lost control of the motorcycle and fell off onto the sidewalk. No physical contact occurred between the motorcycle and the vehicle. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff, concluding that the motor vehicle was sufficiently involved in the accident to allow recovery of no-fault benefits under MCL 500.3105(1).
In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals first recognized that a person’s entitlement to no-fault benefits is determined under MCL 500.3105(1). The court recognized that, “[t]here is no ‘iron-clad rule’ as to what level of involvement is sufficient under MCL 500.3105.” The court cited the case of Kangas v Aetna Cas & Surety Co, 64 Mich App 1 (1975) for the proposition that while the automobile need not be the proximate cause of the injury, there still must be a causal connection between the injury sustained and the ownership, maintenance, or use of an automobile and which causal connection is more than incidental, fortuitous or but for. Furthermore, the court noted that Kangas established that the injury must be foreseeably identifiable with the normal use, maintenance, and ownership of the vehicle. The court also cited the case of Bromley v Citizens Ins Co of America, 113 Mich App 131 (1982), for the proposition that the injuries must be more than tangentially related to the use of an automobile to trigger the entitlement of no-fault benefits. Furthermore, the court also cited the case of Turner v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 448 Mich 222 (1995), for the proposition that for a motor vehicle to be involved in an accident, it must actively, as opposed to passively, contribute to the accident and have more than a random association with the accident scene. The court also cited the case of Thornton v Allstate Ins Co, 425 Mich 643 (1986), as well as McPherson v McPherson, 493 Mich 294 (2013), for the proposition that in a motorcycle accident, the causal connection between the motorcyclist’s injuries and the motor vehicle must be more than incidental, fortuitous, or but for.
As for the specific facts of this case, the court determined there was no causal connection between the motorcyclist’s injuries and the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle sufficient to trigger entitlement to no-fault benefits under MCL 500.3105(1). The court reasoned that even though the motorcyclist’s applied his brakes and began losing control of the motorcycle when he saw the headlights of the approaching vehicle, that did not mean that the motor vehicle was casually connected to the motorcyclist sustaining injuries. The court reasoned that under these facts, it could not determine that the motor vehicle actively contributed to the accident rather than merely being present at the time of the accident. The court further reasoned that while there was no actual collision between the motorcycle and the motor vehicle, it could not say that the motor vehicle was sufficiently involved in the accident, merely because of the motorcyclist’s subjective, erroneous perceived need to react to the motor vehicle. The court went as far as to say that in cases like this one where there is no physical contact between a motorcycle and motor vehicle, the operation of the motor vehicle must have created an actual need for the motorcyclist to take evasive action. In this regard, the court stated in pertinent part:
“In this case, there is no evidence that the motorcyclist needed to take evasive action to avoid the motor vehicle. Rather, the evidence only established that the motorcyclist was startled when he saw the approaching headlights and overreacted to the situation. And while fault is not a relevant consideration in determining whether a motor vehicle is involved in an accident for purposes of no-fault benefits, Turner, 448 Mich at 39, we believe that principle is limited to not considering fault in the cause of the accident, not whether the motor vehicle was actually involved in the accident. That is, had the motorcycle actually collided with the motor vehicle, we would not consider whether the motorcyclist or the motor vehicle driver was at fault in causing the accident, nor would we consider whether the motorcyclist could have taken evasive action and avoided the accident. But, where there is no actual collision between the motorcycle and the motor vehicle, we cannot say that the motor vehicle was involved in the accident merely because of the motorcyclist’s subjective, erroneous perceived need to react to the motor vehicle. Rather, for the motor vehicle to be considered involved in the accident, the operation of the motor vehicle must have created an actual need for the motorcyclist to take evasive action. That is, there must be some activity by the motor vehicle that contributes to the happening of the accident beyond its mere presence. . .”
