Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #306622; Unpublished
Judges Talbot, Wilder, and Stephens; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Exception for Unreasonably Parked Vehicles [§3106(1)(a)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam Opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s Judgment, which found that plaintiff was entitled to no-fault benefits pursuant to MCL 500.3106(1)(a), for injuries the plaintiff sustained when he was operating a motorcycle and swerved to avoid a parked vehicle. In this regard, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s finding that the parked motor vehicle was “unreasonably parked,” under §3106(1)(a).
In this case, the plaintiff was operating his motorcycle in a residential area. He was heading down a street toward an intersection traveling extremely fast. He came to an intersection where he attempted to make a right turn. When he turned right onto the other street, he was confronted with a motor vehicle that was parked on the wrong side of the street and facing the wrong direction. However, the vehicle was not obstructing the roadway and had its headlights and emergency flash lights on. The plaintiff attempted to avoid the motor vehicle, but given his high rate of speed, he swerved off the roadway and crashed into the front porch of the house nearby where the vehicle parked.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals examined whether the trial court properly found that pursuant to MCL 500.3106(1)(a), the parked motor vehicle was “parked in such a way as to cause unreasonable risk of bodily injury which occurred.” The Court of Appeals recognized that in Stewart v Michigan, 471 Mich 692 (2004), the Michigan Supreme Court confirmed that factors such as the manner, location, and fashion in which a vehicle is parked are material in determining whether the parked vehicle poses an unreasonable risk under MCL 500.3106(1)(a). In this case, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court erred in determining that the motor vehicle was unreasonably parked for four main reasons. First, even though the vehicle was parked on the wrong side of the road and its front end was pointing in the wrong direction, the vehicle was parked near the curb and did not protrude into the lane of travel any more than a legally parked vehicle would have. Second, the vehicle had its headlights and emergency lights on, and, therefore, the lights would have alerted anyone in the vicinity to the presence of the parked vehicle. Third, the distance between the vehicle and the intersection provided enough time for the plaintiff to see the vehicle after turning onto the street. Fourth, if the plaintiff was not traveling at such a high rate of speed, he would have been able to avoid the vehicle. The court further explained that in Wills v State Farm Ins Co, 437 Mich 205 (1991), the Michigan Supreme Court confirmed that even though a vehicle might be illegally parked, it may not be unreasonably parked for purposes of MCL 500.3106(1)(a). In this regard, the court stated:
“In reviewing the undisputed facts, we conclude, as did the Court in Stewart, that “[t]here was nothing in the record to suggest that an oncoming . . . driver would not have ample opportunity to observe, react to, and avoid the hazard posed by” Wagner’s parked vehicle. The vehicle did not obstruct traffic any more than a legally parked vehicle, its lights provided notice to everyone in the area to the vehicle’s presence, the slow speed limit would allow oncoming drivers a reasonable amount of time to identify and avoid the vehicle, and the sign on Shrewsbury allowed for those approaching Stratford to yield. Therefore, we hold that Wagner’s vehicle was not parked in such a way that it created an unreasonable risk of injury.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Wills v State Farm Ins Co, 437 Mich 205; 468 NW2d 511 (1991), supports our analysis that the fact a vehicle is illegally parked is not dispositive of the question whether the way the vehicle was parked created an unreasonable risk of injury. “There may be situations where an automobile is illegally parked, . . . but this status as an illegally parked vehicle would not be sufficient to determine that the vehicle was ‘unreasonably parked’ for purposes of no-fault liability.” Id. at 214. In Willis, because the illegally parked vehicle “was completely off the roadway, it was not impeding traffic flow, and it was plainly visible,” it did not constitute an unreasonable risk of harm. Id at 215. Wagner’s vehicle was similarly situated, parked illegally but plainly visible, with its headlights and emergency lights flashing, and not impeding traffic “
