Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #311008; Unpublished
Judges Beckering, O’Connell, and Shapiro; 2-1; Dissent by Judge O’Connell; Per Curiam;
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not applicable; Link to Opinion 
Link to Dissent
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Exception for Entering Into or Alighting From [§3106(1)(c)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this 2-1 unpublished per curiam Opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s Order granting summary disposition in favor of the defendant on whether plaintiff presented evidence sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact that she sustained her injuries while “entering into” her husband’s vehicle for transportational purposes within the meaning of MCL 500.3106(1)(c).
The plaintiff in this case testified that she parked her car under a tree in the driveway of her niece’s home, briefly visited her niece, and then left the home and walked back to her car with the intent of driving it to pick up her husband. As she approached the car, several large branches from the tree fell onto the hood, damaging it. Plaintiff removed the branches, unlocked the car door, and “opened the door to get in.” She testified she was “getting into the car” when another branch fell from the tree and struck her in the head, causing physical injury. At the trial court, the defendant argued that there was no evidence that the plaintiff was “entering into” the vehicle at the time she was injured, for purposes of entitling her to no-fault benefits under MCL 500.3106. The trial court agreed with the defendant’s argument and ordered that plaintiff was not entitled to no-fault benefits.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals recognized that it was well-established in case law that once a plaintiff makes physical contact with a vehicle for purposes of entering it, the process of “entering into” has begun. Specifically, in support of this proposition, the court cited the following cases: Teman v Transamerica Ins Co of Mich, 123 Mich App 262 (1983); Ansara v State Farm Ins Co, 207 Mich App 320 (1994); Shanafelt v Allstate Ins Co, 217 Mich App 625 (1996); Putkamer v Transamerica Ins Co of America, 454 Mich 626 (1997); and McCasline v Hartford Accident & Indemnity, 182 Mich App 419 (1990).
The court further rejected defendant’s argument that in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Frazier v Allstate Ins Co, 490 Mich 381 (2011), a person cannot be found to be “entering into” a motor vehicle, pursuant to MCL 500.3106(1)(c), when a person opens a car door but still has both feet on the ground. The Court of Appeals distinguished Frazier on the grounds that it addressed the issue of “alighting” under MCL 500.3106(1)(c), whereas the issue in this case was whether the plaintiff was “entering into” her motor vehicle under MCL 500.3106(1)(c). The court explained that the plaintiff in Frazier was found to have completed the alighting process when, standing outside of the motor vehicle with both feet on the ground, her hand was shut in the door. By contrast, in this case, the court found that there was at least a question of fact whether the plaintiff began the process of “entering into” the motor vehicle when she opened the door, even though both of her feet may still have been planted on the ground. In this regard, the court recognized that opening a car door is a necessary part of “entering into” the motor vehicle, and, therefore, begins at least when the door is opened. In this regard, the court specifically stated:
Defendant’s reliance on our Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Frazier v Allstate Ins Co, 490 Mich 381; 808 NW2d 450 (2011) is also misplaced. In that case, the Court held that “alighting” from a vehicle is completed once a person has “successfully transferred full control of one’s movement from reliance upon the vehicle to one’s body[,]” which is “typically accomplished when both feet are planted firmly on the ground[,]” even if the person is still in the process of closing the car door. Id. at 386-387. However, closing a car door is not an inherent and necessary action when alighting from a vehicle. Once a plaintiff has opened the door and gotten out, closing the door is an action the plaintiff may choose to do or not do; thus, closing the door is not a necessary part of alighting. By contrast, opening a car door is a necessary part of “entering into” a parked vehicle. A plaintiff may not enter without doing so.3 Indeed, the Frazier Court was careful to note this distinction, stating that, “‘alighting’ is [not] antonymous to ‘entering[.]’” Id. at 385 n 1. In the instant case, plaintiff was required to open her car door in order to accomplish her transportational purpose.
The court further rejected defendant’s argument that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Putkamer v Transamerica Ins Co of America, 454 Mich 626 (1997), the plaintiff’s injuries did not have a causal relationship to the plaintiff’s entrance into the parked motor vehicle that was more than incidental, fortuitous or but for. The court explained that in Putkamer, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected this type of analysis and reasoned that sufficient causal connection exists when a person is determined to claim no-fault benefits under MCL 500.3106(1)(c).
Lastly, the Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s argument that the plaintiff was not entitled to no-fault benefits because the branch falling on her had nothing to do with the transportational function of a motor vehicle. The court reasoned that regardless of the fortuity of the branch falling on the plaintiff as she was entering her motor vehicle, plaintiff’'s uncontroverted testimony was that when the branch fell on her, she was attempting to enter into her motor vehicle to operate it as a motor vehicle.
In his dissent, Judge O’Connell explained that he would affirm summary disposition in favor of defendant on the basis that the record did not contain any evidence to support a finding that there was a causal relationship between the plaintiff’s use of the vehicle as a motor vehicle and the injuries she sustained by the falling tree branch. Judge O’Connell reasoned that the Supreme Court in Putkamer identified three requirements for obtaining no-fault coverage of injuries involving parked vehicles. First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her conduct was within the provisions of MCL 500.3106(1). Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that “the injury arose out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of the parked vehicle as a motor vehicle.” Third, the plaintiff must demonstrate that “the injury had a causal relationship to the parked vehicle that is more than incidental or fortuitous or but for.” Judge O’Connell reasoned that the plaintiff could not establish the third element under Putkamer. Namely, there is no evidence of any causal relationship between the branch falling on the plaintiff’s head and her entrance into the parked vehicle.
