Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #288971; Unpublished
Judges Beckering, Markey, and Borrello; unanimous; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not applicable, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Exception for Permanently Mounted Equipment Use [3106(1)(b)]
Exception for Entering Into or Alighting From [3106(2)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this 2-1 unpublished per curiam opinion decided without oral argument, the Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff who was injured when she fell after she had touched the car door handle but did not know whether she had actually engaged the latch, was not entitled to personal injury protection benefits because the accident did not occur while she was getting into the vehicle under MCL 500.3106(1)(c).
The plaintiff in this case approached the rear door on the driver’s side of her vehicle and touched the handle, intending to open the car door, when she slipped, fell, and was injured. After the insurer denied her claim for benefits, plaintiff filed suit. The trial court granted the insurer summary disposition under MCL 500.3106(1)(c) because the injury was not sustained while plaintiff was entering into or alighting from her vehicle. The Court of Appeals affirmed, citing King v Aetna Casualty, 118 Mich App 648; 325 NW2d 528 (1982). In King, the plaintiff, who slipped and fell as he reached to unlock the car door, was denied benefits because the plaintiff was not entering his vehicle, the plaintiff was merely preparing to enter the vehicle. The Court of Appeals determined that this case is “nearly on all fours” with the King case, because “they both involved persons approaching their vehicles to enter them, but fell before they succeeded in engaging any of their vehicles’ opening mechanisms.” The court then addressed the plaintiff’s argument that she had actually touched the door handle before she fell and, therefore, the King decision does not control. However, the Court of Appeals stated that in King, the Supreme Court determined that it was not significant whether the plaintiff in King had touched the key to the car before he fell. In this regard, the court stated:
“Our Supreme Court has expressly approved the reasoning in King pertaining to what constituted entering, as opposed to merely preparing to enter, a car. . . . The instant case is nearly on all fours with King, in that they both involved persons approaching their vehicles to enter them, but fell before they succeeded in engaging any of their vehicles’ opening mechanisms.
A distinction is that in this case, plaintiff maintains that she had her hand on a door handle as she fell, whereas the plaintiff in King was understood to have his hand two inches from the car when he fell. But this Court, and our Supreme Court, deemed it of no significance whether the King plaintiff had touched key to car before he fell. Similarly, the instant plaintiff reports touching the door handle, but that she cannot remember if she had begun to pull up on it. In both cases, then, the cars were and remained completely closed as their respective drivers fell.”
