Michigan Supreme Court; Docket No. 76180; Published
Opinion By Justice Cavanagh; Unanimous
Michigan Official Reporter Citation: 428 Mich 219; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Definition of Motor Vehicle (General) [§3101(2)(e)]
Entitlement to PIP Benefits: Arising Out of / Causation Requirement [§3105(1)]
Exclusion for Vehicles Considered Parked [§3106(1)]
Exception for Permanently Mounted Equipment Use [§3106(1)(b)]
Workers Comp Liens Regarding Auto Tort Claims [§3116]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Legislative Purpose and Intent
Workers Disability Compensation Act (MCL 418.1, et seq.)
CASE SUMMARY:
The principal issue in this opinion by Justice Cavanagh was whether a workers' compensation insurance company was entitled to reimbursement from plaintiff’s third-party tort recovery. In order to resolve the issue, it was necessary for the Court to determine whether or not plaintiff’s injury arose out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, thereby entitling plaintiff to recover no-fault benefits. If so, then the workers' compensation carrier was merely substituting for a no-fault insurance carrier and would only be entitled to those reimbursement rights that a no-fault insurer would have with respect to a subsequent tort recovery.
The plaintiff was injured on a construction site as a result of an accident involving a motorized four-wheel cement truck. Permanently attached to the cement truck was a concrete pump and a 35-foot boom which was used to pump concrete up to elevated levels. Plaintiff’s injury occurred in the course of his employment when the concrete pump exploded, thereby causing the boom to collapse upon plaintiff. At the time of the accident, the truck was parked and stabilized.
The Supreme Court concluded that the cement truck was "a motor vehicle" within the meaning of §3101 (2)(c) as it was designed for operation upon a public highway. Next, the Court held that the injury "arose out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle." The Court said that this phrase "is not limited to normal vehicular movement on a highway. Motor vehicles are designed and used for many different purposes. The truck involved in this case is a cement truck capable of pouring cement at elevated levels. Certainly one of the intended uses of this motor vehicle (a motor vehicle under the No-Fault Act) is to pump cement. The accident occurred while this vehicle was being used for its intended purpose. We hold that the phrase 'use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle' includes this use."
The Court then shifted its analysis to the parked vehicle provisions of §3106 and concluded that under subsection (b), "plaintiff’s injury occurred as a result of physical contact with permanently mounted vehicle equipment while the equipment was being operated or used. Moreover, plaintiff would not have been excluded from no-fault benefits by virtue of §3106(2) for the reason that plaintiff was not involved in any way with loading, unloading or maintaining the cement truck."
In deciding the issues presented in this case, the Court stated an often cited maxim that, "the No-Fault Act is remedial in nature__ This remedial nature of the No-Fault Act would be advanced by broadly construing its provisions to effectuate coverage."
Due to the fact that plaintiff’s injury would have entitled him to recover no-fault benefits, the workers' compensation carrier was merely substituting for the no-fault insurer, and thus, its reimbursement rights are co-extensive with that of the no-fault insurer. Applying its previous holding in Great American v Queen (Item No. 247), the Court held that the workers' compensation carrier would only be entitled to reimbursement for those benefits which "exceed in duration or amount no-fault benefits that are otherwise payable." The Court held that this "involve" a factual question. Summary judgment was therefore improper and the case was remanded to the trial court for a factual determination as to whether the workers' compensation benefits "exceeded, either in duration or amount, the no-fault benefits due plaintiff."
