Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 99845; Unpublished
Judges Sullivan, Maher, and Clulo; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Determining Serious Impairment of Body Function As a Matter of Law (DiFranco Era – 1987-1995) [§3135(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous per curiam Opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision reinstating plaintiffs' claim for damages for serious impairment of body function upon their motion for relief from an earlier order of summary disposition.
In this case, plaintiff sustained serious injuries to his neck and back as a result of a motor vehicle accident. Defendant brought a motion for summary disposition on the basis of the Cassidy v McGovern standards of serious impairment. At the October 24, 1986 hearing, plaintiffs' counsel urged the trial court to reserve its ruling, since the issue was pending on appeal in the Supreme Court in DiFranco v Pickard. The trial court, however, declined to reserve for ruling and stated that plaintiff would have "a year and a day" to seek relief from the judge if there were a change by the Supreme Court of the rules applicable to the case. Order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant was entered on November 17, 1986.
Following the decision of DiFranco v Pickard on December 23, 1986, plaintiffs filed a motion on January 21,1987 seeking relief from the earlier entry of summary disposition. The trial court granted this motion on March 6, 1987 and reinstated the case.
On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial judge abused her discretion by granting the relief reinstating the case. The Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that there was no abuse of discretion, particularly in light of the trial court's statements to plaintiffs' counsel at the earlier hearing that if the Supreme Court changed the rules, relief could be sought from the entry of summary disposition against plaintiffs.
Although the proper course of action for plaintiffs might have been to take an immediate appeal from the adverse judgment, the provisions of MCR 2.612(C)(1) allowing relief from a judgment were broad enough to encompass the instant case, particularly where the trial court misled plaintiffs' counsel into believing that the proper procedure for obtaining relief from judgment was to file a motion for relief from judgment in that court Therefore, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision reinstating the case.
