Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 118494; Unpublished
Judges Griffin, Sawyer, and Brennan; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Exclusion for Parked Vehicles Covered by Workers Comp [§3106(2)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Workers Disability Compensation Act (MCL 418.1, et seq.)
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous per curiam Opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed a grant of summary disposition for the defendant Michigan Mutual Insurance Company in a case where the plaintiff was seeking no-fault benefits for injuries sustained when he fell off the back of his flatbed trailer truck.
Plaintiff was employed by Capitol Trucking as a truck driver to haul steel. After an employee of the customer unloaded the steel, plaintiff began to climb onto the rear of the trailer to inspect it for debris left from the unloading process. While doing this, his foot slipped and he fell to the ground. Plaintiff injured his back and was unable to work, thereby resulting in his receipt of workers' compensation benefits.
The court found that plaintiff’s activity of attempting to inspect the trailer constituted "unloading" the vehicle within the meaning of the No-Fault Act; and therefore, plaintiff was precluded from receiving PIP benefits under §3106(2), which provides that accidental bodily injury does not arise out of ownership, operation, or use of a parked vehicle if benefits under workers' compensation are available to an employee injured in the course of employment while unloading a vehicle.
In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals herein stated that the leading case of Bell v Boutell Driveaway, 141 Mich App 802 (1985), had ruled that the terms "loading" and "unloading" must be broadly construed to include activities preparatory to the actual loading or unloading of the carries and that the terms include the "complete operation" or "entire process" of loading and unloading.
In this case, the court found that the "unloading" of freight, broadly construed, involved more than the mere removal of freight from the carrier and that there are acts incidental to the actual removal of freight which are part of the unloading process itself. Therefore, the court concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact, and that plaintiff’s act of inspecting for debris left from unloading the steel slabs should be considered part of the unloading process. Accordingly, plaintiff was not entitled to no-fault benefits since they were precluded by the provisions of §3106(2)(a).
