Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 106425; Published
Judges Griffin, Cynar, and Maher; 2-1 (with Judge Maher, Dissenting)
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 177 Mich App 411; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Requirement That Benefits Were Unreasonably Delayed or Denied [§3148(1)]
Bona Fide Factual Uncertainty / Statutory Construction Defense [§3148]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In another decision involving multiple appeals in this case, the Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision by Judge Griffin reversed the trial court's award of attorney fees under §3148 of the no-fault statute on the basis that there existed a legitimate question of statutory construction and insurance coverage under the circumstances giving rise to the claim. The court noted that at trial the defendant prevailed on a motion for directed verdict and that ruling was affirmed in the first appellate decision (142 Mich App 640 [1985]). This decision was ultimately reversed by the Supreme Court who adopted Judge Hood's dissent in the original case (428 Mich 871 [1987]). The court noted that from the time defendant received a directed verdict in the circuit court in June 1983 through the reversal by the Supreme Court in March 1987, defendant was operating pursuant to a valid judgment in its favor. This judgment, and its affirmance by the Court of Appeals, is sufficient evidence of the reasonableness of defendant's position, thus making it inappropriate to award attorney fees.
The court also rejected the proposition that this case was, from its inception, a pure priority dispute as opposed to a dispute regarding entitlement of benefits. The first two courts reviewing this case held it to be an entitlement dispute. It was not until the Supreme Court reversed that the case became a priority dispute. Therefore, the long line of cases that hold it is an unreasonable refusal to pay benefits where the only dispute is one of priority are inapplicable here, in that plaintiff did not herself possess a no-fault insurance policy and entitlement to benefits was disputed.
Judge Maher filed a vigorous dissent stating that this case was from the beginning a priority dispute in spite of the fact that the trial court and Court of Appeals initially failed to appreciate that fact. The Supreme Court's reversal made it clear that this was a priority dispute; and therefore, plaintiff was entitled to no-fault benefits all along with the only dispute being priority. Therefore, plaintiff should be entitled to recover attorney fees under §3148 of the Act.
