Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 105181; Unpublished
Judges Shepherd, Holbrook, and Connor; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Work Loss Benefits: Nature of the Benefit [§3107(1)(b)]
Work Loss Benefits: Calculation of Benefits [§3107(1)(b)]
Wage Loss for Temporarily Unemployed Persons / Qualifications [§3107a]
Standards for Deductibility of State and Federal Governmental Benefits [§3109(1)]
State Workers Compensation Benefits [§3109(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Legislative Purpose and Intent
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals rendered several significant holdings regarding a claim for no-fault wage loss benefits filed by a plaintiff who was injured and drawing workers' compensation as a result of a non-motor vehicle accident injury and, while on disability, sustained additional injury in an automobile accident.
The plaintiff’s prior work injury occurred on June 29,1979. While still on medical leave from that injury, plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident that occurred on July 16,1979. The case proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury found that plaintiff’s disability was a combination of both the work injury and the automobile accident but had it not been for the automobile accident, plaintiff would have returned to work on July 30,1979. Based upon the jury's findings, the trial court awarded work loss benefits and medical expenses to the plaintiff and denied any setoff for duplicative workers' compensation benefits.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, and issued the following specific holdings:
1. The court held that the fact plaintiff was receiving workers' compensation benefits after his automobile accident did not establish, as a matter of law, that plaintiff considered himself disabled due to the first work related accident. The court stated: “There was other evidence presented by plaintiff that he intended to return to work. The mere receipt of workers' compensation benefits in place of other income sources is insufficient to establish the cause of plaintiff s disability as a matter of law."
2. The court affirmed the trial court's decision to read a cautionary instruction to the jury regarding the effect of plaintiff’s receipt of workers' compensation benefits. In this regard, the court stated, "The trial court allowed defendant to present evidence on plaintiff’s acceptance of workers' compensation benefits for the limited purpose of allowing defendant to explain why some no-fault benefits were not paid to plaintiff." The trial court, however, was concerned that the jury would misapply the evidence to decide defendant's liability for no-fault benefits. Accordingly, the trial court read a cautionary instruction to the jury that it should not consider the voluntary payment of benefits by the workers' compensation insurer to decide defendant's liability for no-fault benefits. Under the facts and theories of this case, we believe the trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving the cautionary instruction. Plaintiff’s receipt of workers' compensation benefits was essentially irrelevant to a determination of defendant's liability. The cautionary instruction was necessary to avoid unfair prejudice to plaintiff since there had been no prior determination that plaintiff had a previous work related disability.
3. The court affirmed the trial court's decision that the defendant was not entitled to a setoff for benefits paid by the workers' compensation insurer under §3109(1) of the No-Fault Act. The court noted that, "The underlying intent behind §3109 is to mandate the setoff of benefits that duplicate no-fault benefits. Benefits are not subject to a setoff if they bear no relationship to the reason no-fault benefits are paid. Under the meaning of duplicative benefits (Jarosz v DAIIE (Item No. 702)], we do not believe the payment of workers' compensation benefits in this case serves the same purpose as the no-fault benefits or were provided as a result of the same accident. The workers' compensation carrier began paying benefits for the first accident. The workers' compensation carrier voluntarily continued to pay benefits due to confusion over the cause of plaintiff’s disability, but the jury resolved this issue by deciding plaintiff was disabled as a result of the automobile accident. The two types of benefits cannot be said to be 'duplicative' under the two-part test established in Jarosz."
4. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision to compute the rate of plaintiff’s work loss benefits under the "temporarily unemployed" provisions of §3107a of the no-fault statute rather than actual earnings over the disability period. In holding that benefits should have been calculated under §3107(b), the court stated, "Based upon the Legislature's intent, §3107a has been interpreted as providing work loss benefits only in the place of unemployment compensation. Under this interpretation, the trial court erred by awarding benefits to plaintiff under §3107a when plaintiff had employment and intended to return to work after his medical leave ended. We believe the trial court erred in the computation of work loss benefits by using only the rate for the last full month of employment under §3107a. We therefore remand this matter to the trial court to recompute plaintiff’s work-loss benefits for work he would have performed if not for his disability under §3107(b). This amount should include adjustments to income plaintiff would have had on the job over the three years, if not injured."
5. The court affirmed the trial court's jury instruction on the effect of plaintiffs prior existing condition which instruction "informed the jury that defendant would be liable, even if plaintiff had a pre-existing condition making him susceptible to injury, if the automobile accident either aggravated that condition or combined with the pre-existing condition to cause plaintiffs disability. We believe the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving the jury these special instructions under the facts of this case. Aggravation of a pre-existing condition does not bar an action under the no-fault act if the aggravation can be attributed to an event within the scope of no-fault coverage. The instructions were appropriate since the jury had to assess what physical damages were caused by each accident or could not be apportioned. The fact that the modified instructions were based on tort concepts does not demonstrate error because no-fault benefits are intended to provide benefits for injuries caused by automobile accidents that would otherwise be recoverable in a tort action."
