Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 118317; Published
Judges Hood, Weaver, and Kelly; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 191 Mich App 66; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Exception to General Priority for Non-Occupants [§3115(1)]
Recoupment Between Equal Priority Insurers [§3115(2)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Motor Vehicle Code (Registration and Title Requirements) (MCL 257.201, et seq.)
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous per curiam Opinion, the Court of Appeals dealt with a priority dispute involving two insurance companies regarding who had priority liability to pay no-fault survivors' loss benefits to an otherwise uninsured pedestrian who was struck and killed by a 1978 Monte Carlo. The Monte Carlo was driven by Gary Brizendine, whose wife, Barbara, received title to the vehicle from her mother, Anna Crosby, on June 24,1986, approximately three weeks before Ms. Crosby died. After receiving the endorsed title, Barbara filed an application for a new certificate of title on August 21,1986, and a new title was issued on August 23,1986. However, Barbara did not apply for a new registration with the Secretary of State.
The accident in question occurred on October 11,1986. At the time, Gary and Barbara Brizendine owned two automobiles that were insured by Allstate. Sentry Insurance Company insured the Monte Carlo while it was owned by Anna Crosby.
The trial court held that Allstate and Sentry were of equal priority under §3115(2), and thus, both were equally liable for no-fault benefits. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision and held that only Allstate was liable to pay no-fault benefits.
In reaching its holding, the court relied upon the language of §3115(1) which states that a nonoccupant recovers PIP benefits in the following order of priority:
a. insurers of owners or registrants of motor vehicles involved in the accident;
b. insurers of operators of motor vehicles involved in the accident.
The court cited Cason v Auto Owners (Item No. 1330) where it was determined that the terms "owners" and "registrants" of a motor vehicle are distinct terms. The court then cited a series of Motor Vehicle Code sections dealing with transfer of title and registration of a vehicle. In discussing these sections, the court emphasized that Barbara Brizendine, as transferee of her mother's Monte Carlo, did register a change in ownership and obtained a new certificate of title. In light of the fact that Barbara's mother did not transfer registration by assignment to Barbara as a family member under §233 of the Motor Vehicle Code, Barbara was required to apply for a new registration pursuant to MCLA 257.217. Under MCLA 257.234, a vehicle is deemed to be unregistered if within 15 days from the transfer of ownership, the transferee fails to obtain registration, either by way of application for a new registration or by qualified transfer of registration. Therefore, the court held that the Monte Carlo was an unregistered vehicle at the time of the accident Accordingly, there was no basis on the record to conclude that Sentry's insured, Anna Crosby, was the registrant of the Monte Carlo at the time of the accident. Clearly, however, Barbara Brizendine was the "owner" of the vehicle and she was insured by Allstate. Therefore, under §3115(1), Allstate, as insurer of the owner of this unregistered vehicle, was obligated to pay PIP benefits to the fatally injured pedestrian without recoupment from Sentry.
The court also rejected Allstate's argument that the Sentry policy was still in effect at the time of the accident because Anna Crosby did not transfer or cancel the policy upon transferring title to the car. The court distinguished the earlier decision in Madar v League General (Item No. 942) as a case that involved a claim for first party PIP benefits by the named insured who was insured as a pedestrian. The insured had sold his vehicle but did not cancel the policy. The court's decision in Madar that the insurance policy still covered the claim was based on §3114(1) and a recognition of the statutory purpose that individuals insure their own personal protection with their own no-fault policy. The court held, "These considerations do not apply where, as here, the claimant is not the named insured claiming under their own policy pursuant to §3114, but rather is an uninsured non-occupant claiming under §3115(1)."