Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 120298; Unpublished
Judges Murphy, Sullivan, and Sawyer; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Disqualification for Uninsured Owners or Registrants of Involved Motor Vehicles or Motorcycles [§3113(b)]
Definition of Owner [§3101(2)(h)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Motor Vehicle Code (Definition of Owner) (MCL 257.37) (MCL 257.401a)
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous per curiam Opinion (with Judge Murphy concurring in the result only), the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision that plaintiff was disqualified from receiving no-fault benefits under the terms of §3113(b), which denies no-fault benefits to the owner of an uninsured vehicle involved in an accident. The court held that an issue of fact existed which made summary disposition inappropriate. The accident giving rise to this litigation occurred before the 1988 legislative amendment to the definition of "owner" as set forth in §3101(2)(g). Prior to this amendment, the Motor Vehicle Code definition of "owner" set forth in MCLA 257.37(b) controlled the determination of who was an owner. Under the pre-amendment Motor Vehicle Code definition of owner, it was necessary for an individual to have one of the following relationships with a vehicle in order to be considered an owner: (1) exclusive control over the vehicle for 30 days; (2) hold legal title to the vehicle; or (3) be a conditional vendee, lessee, or mortgager with immediate right to possession.
Under the 1988 amendment (which amended the Motor Vehicle Code definition and the No-Fault Act), the third category of relationship is no longer sufficient to render one an owner. The Court of Appeals rejected plaintiff’s argument that the 1988 amendment applied retroactively. Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiff would be considered an "owner" and therefore disqualified under §3113(b) of the No-Fault-Act if he fell under the third category of vehicle relationship, i.e., was a conditional vendee, lessee, or mortgager with immediate right to possession. On this issue, the court ruled that there was an issue of fact. The plaintiff agreed to buy the vehicle in question from the previous owner for an agreed upon price of $600. However, there was a disagreement as to how this amount was to be paid. The previous owner delivered the vehicle to the plaintiff along with the license plate. The owner claimed that he signed the certificate of title to the car and left it in the console of the vehicle, but the plaintiff was not aware that the title had been signed and left with the vehicle. There was also some uncertainty as to when plaintiff was supposed to receive the title. However, plaintiff, upon taking possession of the vehicle, drove it in spite of the fact that he knew the insurance had been canceled and that the vehicle did not have a proper license plate.
In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals held:
"Here a question of fact exists regarding whether plaintiff was a conditional vendee Although the deposition testimony seems to show that the parties to the agreement did not intend that [the owner] retain title until the purchase price was paid, and thus that this was not a conditional sale, a proper determination depends on the intent and credibility of the parties to the agreement. Therefore, summary disposition was inappropriate."
