Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 310816; Unpublished
Judges Beckering, Meter, and Riordan; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Parked Motor Vehicles: Exception for Loading / Unloading [§3106(1)(b)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam Opinion regarding the applicability of the parked-vehicle exception, the Court of Appeals held that a claimant injured while assisting his uncle from a parked vehicle is not entitled to PIP benefits because his uncle is not considered “property” within the meaning of the MCL 500.3106(1)(b).
The plaintiff in this case injured his knees while helping his uncle from a parked vehicle and sought to recover no-fault PIP benefits from defendant Auto-Owners under the parked-vehicle exception set forth in MCL 500.3106(1)(b). The sole issue in this case was whether the plaintiff’s uncle could be considered “property” within the meaning of §3106(1)(b), which provides for PIP benefits when an injury occurs as “a direct result of physical contact with . . . property being lifted onto or lowered from the vehicle in the loading or unloading process.” The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff’s uncle was not considered “property” within the meaning of §3106(1)(b).
In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that the word “property” is not defined under the No-Fault Act and therefore must be given its “usual and customary meaning.” The Court then noted that central to the concept of property is existence of a tangible thing for which ownership and legal title can be had. In this regard, the Court explained that:
“[I]n Black’s Law Dictionary . . . the word ‘property’ is defined as denoting ‘everything which is the subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal. . . .’ 6th ed, p 1216. Another common definition of property is ‘[s]omething tangible or intangible to which its owner has legal title.’” The American Heritage Dictionary (2d college ed), p 993. [Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 445 Mich at 478.]
The court further noted that “the current version of Black’s includes a consistent definition: ‘Any external thing over which the rights of possession, use, and enjoyment are exercised. . . .’”
After applying the foregoing principles, the Court concluded that while a person is “arguably a ‘thing,’ a person cannot be owned or possessed” and therefore is not cannot be “property” for purposes of §3106(1)(b). Accordingly, the Court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover PIP benefits for his knee injuries.
