Michigan Supreme Court; Docket No. 92675; Published
Justice Brickley; 5-2 (with Justices Levin and Cavanagh, Dissenting)
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 442 Mich 520; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Entitlement to Benefits for Out of State Accidents [§3111]
Exception for Occupying [§3106(1)(c)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Legislative Purpose and Intent
Private Contract (Meaning and Intent)
Uninsured Motorist Benefits: Uninsured Motorist Coverage in General
CASE SUMMARY:
In this 5-2 decision by Justice Brickley (Justices Levin and Cavanagh dissenting), the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals holding in a case interpreting the meaning of the term "occupant" as used in §3111 of the no-fault act governing entitlement to injured persons to receive no-fault benefits in out-of-state accidents. This section provides that PIP benefits are payable in any out-of-state accident to any "occupant of a motor vehicle involved in the accident whose owner or registrant was insured under a personal protection insurance policy." The majority opinion in this case held that the plaintiff was not an occupant of an insured van because he was not physically inside the van when the accident occurred, and therefore, plaintiff was not entitled to PIP benefits under the provisions of §3111 as they applied to the van.
In this case, plaintiff was struck by a hit-and-run driver in an out-of-state automobile accident. The plaintiff was a passenger in a mini-van registered in Michigan and insured by defendant Hawkeye. The van was being driven in Ohio with plaintiff as a passenger, when a two wheel trailer being pulled by the van became unhitched. The trailer overturned and came to rest in the center lane of the highway. The operator of the van turned around and parked behind the overturned trailer and the plaintiff got out of the van and walked 10 to 20 feet toward the trailer, intending to turn it over on its wheels. While attempting to do so, an unidentified vehicle struck the trailer and the plaintiff, injuring the plaintiff severely. Since plaintiff had no insurance of his own, he sought to recover PIP benefits and uninsured motorist benefits from Hawkeye, the insurer of the mini-van. The trial court, broadly interpreting the term "occupant" held that the plaintiff was an occupant of the insured van and awarded him PIP benefits and uninsured motorist benefits. The Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision affirmed (see Item No. 1500). The Court of Appeals felt obligated to follow the decision in Nickerson v Citizens Mutual Insurance Company, 393 Mich 324 (1975) which was a pre-no-fault accident case in which the Supreme Court broadly construed the term "occupying" as used in the insurance policy. The Court of Appeals felt that since policy language was at issue in the instant case, it was bound to follow the holding in Nickerson, and therefore, distinguished the holding in Royal Globe Insurance Company v Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance Company, 419 Mich 565 (1984), which was a case construing the term "occupant" as used in the no-fault act.
The Supreme Court held that neither the Court of Appeals nor the trial court addressed the application of §3111 to the present case. The Supreme Court held that §3111 directly applies, since the accident clearly occurred in a state other than Michigan. Because plaintiff had no other PIP benefits, to be entitled to benefits, plaintiff must show that he was an occupant of a vehicle involved in the accident. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals, in deciding to follow Nickerson, supra, failed to acknowledge the significance of the adoption of the no-fault act, which was passed subsequent to Nickerson and prior to the Royal Globe, supra, decision. For purposes of the no-fault act, under the holding in Royal Globe, supra, the act would be better served by the certainty and predictability that a literal construction of the word "occupant" would yield. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in Royal Globe, supra, and held that by giving the term occupant its primary and generally understood meaning, concluded that the plaintiff was not an occupant of the van because he was not physically inside in the van when the accident occurred. The court also found guidance in its interpretation of the term "occupant" by looking to the provisions of §3106(l)(c) which makes reference to injuries sustained by a person while "occupying, entering into, or alighting from" the vehicle. Since the Legislature expressly recognized that "entering into" and "alighting from" are acts separate from "occupying" a vehicle, and since §3111 does not include "entering into" or "alighting from" as acts that would trigger PIP benefits for persons in an out-of-state accident, it follows that the meaning of occupant as contained in §3111 requires the injured plaintiff to be physically inside the van when the accident occurred.
The Supreme Court also addressed the issue of whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to PIP benefits because he was an occupant of the overturned "trailer." The lower court made no determination of this issue, since they had concluded that plaintiff was an occupant of the van. The Supreme Court held that the analysis of whether plaintiff was an occupant of the trailer is similar to that discussed above with respect to the van. However, the record is inadequate for resolution of this issue, and therefore, the matter was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings and consideration of whether plaintiff was an occupant of the trailer, and if so, whether the trailer was a "covered vehicle" within the meaning of Hawkeye's insurance policy.
Finally, the Supreme Court addressed plaintiffs claim for uninsured motorist benefits. This claim is based upon the language of the insurance policy, rather than on statutory language. The policy requires that the injury have occurred by accident and have been sustained by a "covered person." A covered person under the insurance policy is the insured, a family member of the insured, or any other "person occupying the covered auto." Once again, the Supreme Court felt that the lower court had not adequately addressed the issues of whether the van was a "covered auto" under the policy, and whether the plaintiff was occupying the trailer as the term is defined in the insurance policy. Therefore, the matter was remanded to the Court of Appeals to address and consider whether, for purposes of uninsured motorist benefits, plaintiff was occupying either the van or the trailer, as it is defined in the Hawkeye policy.
Justice Levin in his dissent, joined by Justice Cavanagh, pointed out that the term "occupant" is not defined in §3111 or elsewhere in the no-fault act. However, the term "occupying" is defined in the insurance policy to include not only a person physically in a vehicle, but also one who is on or upon a vehicle. The dissent would hold that the plaintiff was injured while he was "upon" the van or trailer within the meaning of the word in the policy as construed by the Supreme Court in its pre-no-fault decision in Nickerson, supra. The dissent would hold that the post-no-fault case of Royal Globe, supra, is not applicable because the policy of insurance in this case provides greater coverage to a person "occupying" a vehicle than is provided to an "occupant" under §3111, as that term is being construed by the majority. Courts generally hold that a policy of insurance may provide greater coverage than is statutorily mandated. The majority opinion avoids deciding whether the Hawkeye policy provides coverage broader than is required by the no-fault act, even though the no-fault endorsement specifically provides for PIP coverage to a person who is "occupying" an automobile in an out-of-state accident, and even though the definitions section of the policy includes the definition of "occupying" and applies it to the no-fault endorsement, and even though the term "occupying" is defined to provide "on" or "upon" coverage.
The dissent would also hold that plaintiff is entitled to uninsured motorist benefits since resolution of the issue of uninsured motorist coverage depends solely upon whether plaintiff was "occupying" the mini-van or trailer within the meaning of the policy, and does not turn upon the majority's literal interpretation of the statutory language.
