Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 153495; Published
Judges Gribbs, Reilly, and Thomas L. Brown; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 207 Mich App 323; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Exclusion for Parked Vehicles Covered by Workers Comp [§3106(2)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Legislative Purpose and Intent
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous per curiam published Opinion, the Court of Appeals granted summary disposition in favor of defendant in a case of first impression interpreting the parked vehicle provisions of §3106(2)(b) where plaintiff was injured while adjusting the restraints securing motor vehicles being transported on his semi-truck/trailer.
Plaintiff was injured in 1989 while operating a semi-truck/trailer which was transporting motor vehicles. While in transit, he noticed that one of the vehicles being transported had broken loose of its restraint and was bumping into the rear of the cab. He pulled into a rest area to reattach and tighten the restraints. After finishing, he stepped onto the fuel tank to get back into the cab and slipped. As he fell to the ground, he hit his back and shoulders on the edge of the fuel tank. Plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits for his injuries. Defendant paid no-fault benefits for a period of time and then discontinued on the grounds that §3106(2) precluded him from receiving such benefits. Defendant argued at trial that plaintiff was not entitled to no-fault benefits because at the time he sustained his injuries, he was attempting to climb from the trailer into the cab, and therefore, was still in the loading and unloading process. In the alternative, defendant argued that plaintiff sustained his injuries "entering into" his parked motor vehicle.
Under §3106(2), accidental bodily injury does not arise out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a parked vehicle, if benefits under the Workers' Disability Compensation Act are available to an employee who sustains the injury in the course of his employment while (a) loading, unloading, or doing mechanical work on a vehicle; or (b) entering into or alighting from the vehicle unless the injury was sustained while entering into or alighting from the vehicle immediately after the vehicle became disabled.
In holding for the defendant, the trial court determined that the "disabled" vehicle provision of §3106(2)(b) requires some sort of motor vehicle disability and does not contemplate or permit recovery where a worker must pull off the road to adjust the load, but where there is nothing wrong with the vehicle itself.
The Court of Appeals, noting that this is an issue of first impression, held that to interpret the meaning of "disabled" in subsection (b) of the statute, it is helpful to consider the court's interpretation of "loading and unloading" as used in subsection (a) of the statute. The court has adopted a broad definition of "loading and unloading" to include acts incidental to both the preparation and completion of the loading and unloading process. The court held that the Legislature intended to limit recovery so that an employee could not collect no-fault benefits in addition to workers' compensation benefits, except where the vehicle was "disabled" and the employee was injured while entering or alighting from it. The Court of Appeals held that the term "disabled" requires the disability of the motor vehicle itself, in that this interpretation furthers the legislative intent of limiting the situations under which "double coverage" is permitted. The court declined to follow the holding in the similar case of Mahdesian v Wausau Insurance Company, 742 F Supp 13S2 (1990) which had found that where chains securing the load on a tractor-trailer had come loose, the unstable load "disabled" the motor vehicle.
