Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 154111; Unpublished
Judges Corrigan, Wahls, and Maceroni; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Exception for Occupants [§3114(4)]
Exception to General Priority for Non-Occupants [§3115(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous per curiam unpublished Opinion, the Court of Appeals interpreted the priority provisions of §3115(1) to determine which of two insurance companies were responsible for plaintiffs no-fault benefits, where plaintiff was injured when standing outside of his vehicle reaching into the trunk. The Court of Appeals concluded that the injured party was not an occupant of the uninsured vehicle he was reaching into at the time of the accident, and therefore, benefits were recoverable from the striking vehicle's insurance company.
Plaintiff Gibson was operating a motor vehicle owned by his mother when it stalled on the roadway. He exited the vehicle and after examining the engine, walked behind the vehicle and opened the trunk to retrieve a screwdriver. As he leaned down and reached his hand into the trunk, he was struck by a vehicle insured by State Farm. The vehicle owned by Gibson's mother, and into which he was reaching, was not insured. Gibson did not have an insurance policy of his own providing no-fault coverage. Due to the dispute with regard to coverage, Gibson's no-fault claim was assigned through the Assigned Claims Facility to Allstate Insurance.
In construing the provisions of §3115(1), the court held that Gibson was not an occupant of his mother's vehicle at the time he was struck. Section 3115(1) of the no-fault act provides in relevant part:
1. Except as provided in §3114(1), a person suffering an accidental bodily injury while not an occupant of a motor vehicle shall claim personal protection insurance benefits from insurers in the following order of priority:
a. Insurers of owners or registrants of motor vehicles involved in the accident
b. Insurers of operators of motor vehicles involved in the accident.
In rejecting State Farm's argument that Gibson was an "occupant" of the uninsured vehicle at the time of the accident, the Court of Appeals relied upon the Supreme Court holding in Rohlman v Hawkeye Security Insurance Company, 442 Mich 520 (1993), which construed the word "occupant" in the context of §3111 of the act The Supreme Court held that the term "occupant" is to be given its primary and generally understood meaning. In that case, the court held that because the plaintiff was not physically inside of the van when the accident occurred, he was not an occupant.
Construing the term "occupant" in the instant case, the Court of Appeals held that §3114(4), in light of Rohlman, supra, did not preclude recovery from State Farm because Gibson was not an occupant of the vehicle at the time he was struck. The court noted that Gibson was standing outside the vehicle with no intention of entering it Although he was leaning and reaching into the trunk, Gibson was not in the process of entering the trunk, nor was he in physical contact with the vehicle. Based upon this analysis, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court determination that Gibson was not an occupant of the uninsured vehicle within the meaning of §3115(1) and the trial court entry of summary disposition in favor of Allstate was affirmed.
