United States District Court, Western District of Michigan; Docket No. 1:90-CV 252;
Honorable Robert Holmes Bell; Published
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: _________; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
General Rule of Priority [§3114(1)]
Exception for Occupants [§3114(4)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Equitable Estoppel
CASE SUMMARY:
This is the third reported decision arising from this case. See Items 1566 and 1661.
In his July 16,1992 decision, Judge Bell denied summary disposition brought by plaintiffs no-fault insurer, Granite State, alleging that plaintiff was not entitled to no-fault benefits because he was not injured while "an occupant" of his employer's vehicle (plaintiff had left his vehicle after the collision in order to exchange insurance information with the other driver, when he was struck by another vehicle and injured). In that first decision, Judge Bell relied in part upon the decision in Rohlman v Hawkeye Security Insurance Company, 190 Mich App 540 (1991), which held that in a similar case, what was at issue was construction of the term "occupying" under the insurance policy, rather than construction of the term "occupant" under the no-fault act.
The subject of the current opinion is whether Granite State is entitled to recovery of the no-fault benefits it paid to the plaintiff on the ground that plaintiff was not an occupant of his employer's vehicle at the time of the accident within the meaning of the Supreme Court's decision in Rohlman v Hawkeye Insurance Company, 442 Mich 520 (1993), reversing the Court of Appeals, and holding that "occupant" should be given its common meaning, and that meaning does not include one was not physically inside the vehicle when the accident occurred.
Granite State filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that it was entitled to reimbursement of the no-fault benefits it paid to plaintiff because it paid wage loss benefits pursuant to §3114(3) under the mistaken belief that plaintiff was an "occupant" of his employer's vehicle at the time of the accident.
Granite State did not contend entitlement to reimbursement under the no-fault act, but rather, under its common law right to recover payments under a mistake of fact In his opinion, Judge Bell held that there was no dispute that plaintiff was entitled to no-fault wage loss benefits in this case, the only question was whether Granite State or some other insurer was required to make those payments. Since this issue is a priority problem, Granite State's remedy is to seek recoupment from other insurers, not reimbursement from the victim of the accident Further, Judge Bell held that Granite State has not come forward with any evidence that it did not know the location of the plaintiff at the time of the accident, or that it was mistaken or mislead as to the facts surrounding the accident It is a general rule that equity will not relief against a mistake of law. The court noted that at the time of plaintiff s accident in 1988, the contours of the term "occupant" as used in the no-fault law were not clear. The purposes of the act would not be served if the court invited no-fault providers to attempt to later recover payments made based upon Michigan's courts changing interpretation of the no-fault act Due to a lapse of time since payments were made, plaintiff would now be foreclosed by statute from recovering those no-fault benefits from other insurers who might have been liable. It would be unfair to penalize plaintiff for Granite State's late decision that it was under no duty to pay wage loss benefits.
