Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 144516; Unpublished
Judges Hood, Murphy, and Fitzgerald; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Not Applicable
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Evidentiary Issues
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous per curiam unpublished Opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed a jury verdict of no cause of action involving a claim for back injury arising from a motor vehicle accident. Defendants admitted negligence but contested the issue of whether or not plaintiffs back injury was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s pain. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused his discretion in denying plaintiffs motion for a new trial because the verdict was contrary to the great weight of the evidence regarding causation.
Plaintiff testified in this case that he suffered from intense lower back pain since the date of the accident. He admitted that he had a second accident four months after first, but stated that it was less serious and did not aggravate his back condition. There was extensive evidence of the damage caused to plaintiff’s life by the unremitting back pain.
The evidence of experts consisted of plaintiff s doctor who testified that after the accident plaintiff was in severe pain, suffering from headaches, muscle spasms and could hardly move. A fracture of the spinous process of one of plaintiff s lumbar vertebrae was discovered by CAT scan about six weeks after the accident. This scan also showed that the top third of the surrounding ligaments had been jerked away from the vertebrae and had probably caused the fracture. Plaintiff had no prior history of back problems. Plaintiff’s physician determined that the fracture was the result of his automobile accident.
After plaintiff’s second auto accident, he continued to complain of severe back pain. Another CAT scan at that time was done which showed a herniated disc at the same vertebrae where the fracture had been seen and which appeared to be pressing against the nerve group.
Defendants' expert admitted on cross-examination that plaintiff apparently did sustain an avulsion fracture of the spinous process. Defendant's expert also stated in a letter that he felt plaintiffs pain was a direct result of the automobile accident.
The Court of Appeals in reversing the jury's verdict, held that although the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant plaintiffs motion for JNOV because there were some factual questions upon which reasonable minds could differ, nevertheless the court did abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion for a new trial because the verdict was contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Therefore, although a jury is entitled to disbelieve even the most positive and uncontroverted evidence, its verdict may be set aside and a new trial ordered when it is perverse in light of the evidence on the whole record.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial.