Michigan Supreme Court; Docket No. 144781; Published
Peremptory Order of the Court
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Forthcoming; Link to Order 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Exception for Unreasonably Parked Vehicles [§3106(1)(a)]
Exception for Permanently Mounted Equipment Use [§3106(1)(b)]
Exception for Loading / Unloading [§3106(1)(b)]
Causal Connection Requirement
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this Peremptory Order, the Michigan Supreme Court vacated the December 13, 20013 judgment of the Court of Appeals in lieu of granting leave to Appeal and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings because the Court of Appeals failed to properly apply the holdings in Frazier v Allstate Ins Co, 490 Mich 381 (2011).
The Plaintiff in this case was injured while attempting to unload contaminated dirt from the trailer of a dump truck into a landfill. While he was attempting to do so, the tailgate of the trailer did not swing open as it should have, and the plaintiff attempted to force it open. The tailgate then broke free and caused the plaintiff to lose his balance and fall approximately 12 feet onto a dirt-covered concrete surface below. The Plaintiff injured his back and filed a claim for first party benefits, which the defendant denied.
The plaintiff filed suit arguing in part that he was entitled to receive PIP benefits under the parked-vehicle exceptions set forth in MCL 500.3106(1)(b). The Court of Appeals agreed and went on to hold that summary disposition was properly denied to the defendant after concluding based on the holdings in Gunsell v Ryan, 236 Mich App 204 (1999) and Miller v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 411 Mich 633 (1981) that the tailgate of the trailer constituted "equipment" under 500.3106(1)(b) and a question of fact remained regarding whether the plaintiff's injury resulted from his physical contact with the tailgate.
In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals decision and remanded for further proceedings, finding that the Court of Appeals "erred by failing to recognize that the decision in Frazier . . . effectively disavowed Miller . . . and Gunsell to the extent those decisions are inconsistent with Frazier." In this regard, the Supreme Court explained:
"Specifically, Frazier effectively disavowed as dicta the portion of Miller, supra, stating: “Section 3106(b) recognizes that some parked vehicles may still be operated as motor vehicles, creating a risk of injury from such use as a vehicle. Thus a parked delivery truck may cause injury in the course of raising or lowering its lift or the door of a parked car, when opened into traffic, may cause an accident. Accidents of this type involve the vehicle as a motor vehicle.” 411 Mich at 640. Frazier also effectively disavowed the discussion of MCL 500.3106(1)(b) in Gunsell, supra, 236 Mich App at 210 n 5.”
The Court then instructed that on remand, "the circuit court shall reconsider the defendant’s motion for summary disposition in light of Frazier, and shall allow the parties to expand the evidentiary record to the extent necessary for a determination whether the tailgate on the plaintiff’s dump trailer was 'equipment permanently mounted on the vehicle' for purposes of MCL 500.3106(1)(b)." The Court further clarified that “the parties shall be allowed to present evidence as to whether the tailgate was a constituent part of the ‘means in or by which [the contaminated soil was] carried or conveyed,’ and, if not, whether the tailgate was nonetheless an ‘article[], implement[], etc.,’ that was ‘mounted on the vehicle’ and ‘used or needed for a specific purpose or activity.’”
