Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 170106; Published
Judges Sawyer, Bandstra, and R. B. Burns; Unanimous; Opinion by Judge Bandstra
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 209 Mich App 379; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Nature and Scope of PPI Benefits (Property Damage and Loss of Use) [§3121(1)]
Property Owned by Named Insured [§3123(1)(b)]
Determination of Involved Vehicle [§3125]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this published Opinion authored by Judge Bandstra, the Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment granted by the trial court in favor of a homeowner's insurance policy carrier and against a no-fault insurer in a priority dispute involving property protection insurance benefits.
The parties stipulated to the facts in the case. Cincinnati Insurance Company provided no-fault insurance coverage on a Ford Bronco, while Pennsylvania General Insurance Company provided homeowners coverage on the house owned by the Bronco owner. A fire originated in the Bronco while it was parked in the garage, that resulted in damage to the house and the vehicle.
The Court of Appeals noted that the issue of which insurer had the responsibility for coverage depended upon the application of §3123(l)(b) of the no-fault act, which excludes from coverage for property protection insurance benefits for damage to property owned by a named insured, if that person was the owner, operator or registrant of the vehicle which is "involved in the motor vehicle accident out of which the property damage arose." The trial court held that the subject fire did not "involve" the insured vehicle, and, therefore, the exclusion for no-fault coverage did not apply, making Pennsylvania General Insurance Company, the no-fault insurer, primarily liable.
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court's interpretation of §3123. It distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Heard v Slate Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 414 Mich 139 (1982) (Item No. 538), where the court found personal protection insurance benefits available where a parked vehicle was not "involved in the accident" for purposes of the disqualification provisions of §3113. In contrast, the Court of Appeals here noted that the parties had stipulated that the fire originated in the car as a result of one or both of two known mechanical problems. Accordingly, since the fire originated in the insured vehicle in this manner, it was "intimately involved in the accident."
Since the exclusion as set forth in §3123(l)(b) applies in this case, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the homeowner's insurer, rather than the no-fault insurer.
