Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 177517; Published
Judges Hood, Young, and Brown; .Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 218 Mich App 221; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Disqualification for Intentionally Suffered Injury [§3105(4)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Evidentiary Issues
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous published per curiam Opinion, the Court of Appeals denied no-fault benefits to plaintiff under the intentional injury provisions of §3105(4) for the reason that plaintiff sustained his injury while attempting to commit suicide. The plaintiff in this case incurred serious injuries when he drove his truck into a tree at 70 miles per hour. Just prior to the collision, the plaintiff wrote a note to his wife strongly suggesting he intended to kill himself. After the accident, plaintiff told the deputy sheriff who investigated the incident that he was trying to kill himself. In addition, plaintiff testified he was attempting suicide when he gave deposition testimony. The court found that all of this evidence eliminated any genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff’s injury was suffered intentionally by him. Although the plaintiff offered affidavit testimony of a social worker that he was suffering from severe depression and lacked the mental capacity to form the intent to commit suicide, the court, in relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in Auto Owners Insurance Company v Churchman, 440 Mich 560 (1992), held that a claim of mental illness does not, by itself, create a factual question regarding the actor's intent. The court did not feel there was irreconcilable conflict between the Churchman decision and the Court of Appeals decision in the no-fault case of Mattson v Farmers Insurance Exchange (Item No. 1316). The court characterized Mattson as a decision involving "extraordinary facts." In that case, two psychiatrists observed plaintiff before his accident and ordered him committed. There was testimony that his mental condition and organic brain syndrome prevented him from forming an intent to commit suicide. However, Mattson did not stand for the proposition that the presence of mental illness, ipso facto vitiates intent. On the contrary, those who are mentally ill may very well "intend" their actions. Quoting from Mattson, this panel stated:
"Those who are insane may intend to write, to sleep, to die. The issue for the purposes of the no-fault statute, is not the source of motive of the intent, but merely its existence."
