Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #307137; Unpublished
Judges Gleicher, Sawyer, and Ford Hood; Unanimous; Per Curiam;
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Entitlement to PIP Benefits: Arising Out of / Causation Requirement [§3105(1)]
General / Miscellaneous [§3135]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam Opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary disposition dismissing the plaintiff's action for first-party no-fault benefits, as well as the plaintiff's third-party auto negligence action. With respect to the plaintiff’s action for first party no-fault PIP benefits, the Court of Appeals determined summary disposition was inappropriate because the plaintiff demonstrated there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether he sustained injuries arising out of the subject motor vehicle collision. With respect to the plaintiff’s third-party auto negligence case, the Court of Appeals determined defendant Allstate did not properly file a motion for summary disposition regarding the plaintiff's claim for noneconomic damages, and, therefore, it was improper for the trial court to have dismissed the plaintiff's third¬-party auto claim.
The plaintiff in this case, James Brown, was injured in a motor vehicle collision that occurred on September 2, 2009. Prior to the collision, Mr. Brown had a history of back pain that caused him to be disabled in various ways. However, Mr. Brown claimed the subject motor vehicle collision worsened his condition in his lower back and caused him to suffer new symptoms from which he was not suffering prior to the collision. Mr. Brown ultimately brought a consolidated action against his no-fault insurer, Allstate Insurance Company, and Amy Krol, the at-fault driver. Allstate filed a motion for summary disposition against Mr. Brown's no-fault benefit case on the basis Mr. Brown could not prove the collision caused him to sustain his alleged back injuries. The third-party defendant, Ms. Krol, then filed a concurrence to Allstate's motion, but did not specify she was also asking for summary disposition against Mr. Brown's third-party action against her.
The Court of Appeals first addressed the dismissal of Mr. Brown's no-fault benefit case. In determining the trial court erred in dismissing the case as a matter of law, the Court of Appeals reasoned that under MCL 500.3105(1) and applicable case law, a no-fault insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily injuries arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle and that a person may recover no-fault benefits if he can demonstrate that the accident aggravated or exacerbated a pre-existing condition. Based upon these principles, the Court of Appeals reasoned that when the evidence was viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Brown, there was clearly a question of fact regarding whether the collision exacerbated or worsened Mr. Brown's back condition that caused Mr. Brown to be disabled and the need for the subject of medical treatment. In this regard, the Court of Appeals stated:
"Viewed in the light most favorable to Brown, the evidence supports that the September 2009 auto accident either exacerbated an underlying condition or caused a new back injury. Payton’s medical records attest to the accident’s causal role in aggravating or producing Brown’s back pain and claimed disability, as did the disability certificate Payton signed in 2010. Although Payton testified that Brown had back problems before the accident, he also asserted that those problems had never resulted in pain. Furthermore, the disabilities reflected in the certifications signed by Payton before the accident relate exclusively to ankle and knee injuries rather than back problems. Thus, the record contains evidence that, if credited by the fact-finder, could support that the accident caused back problems resulting in reasonable and necessary medical expenses."
With respect to the trial court dismissing Mr. Brown's third-party auto case, the Court of Appeals determined the case was improperly dismissed by the trial court, because the defendants did not file a motion that specifically stated it was moving for summary disposition of the third-party case under MCL 500.3135(1). The court noted that the defendants failed to satisfy MCR 2.116, which requires a party to specifically identify the issues to which the moving party believes there is no genuine issue of material fact and provide proper notice of the motion to the non-moving party. In this regard, the Court of Appeals stated:
"When pursuing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the moving party must 'specifically identify the issues as to which the moving party believes there is no genuine issue as to any material fact'. . . .
‘The level of specificity required under MCR 2.116(G)(4) is that which would place the nonmoving party on notice of the need to respond to the motion made under MCR 2.116(C)(10).’ . . .
Allstate’s summary disposition motion and brief (and Krol’s barebones concurrence) failed to identify any specific challenge to Brown’s third-party claim. Allstate’s brief included no citations to evidence supporting that there existed no genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether Brown’s injuries met the McCormick threshold. Because neither Allstate nor Krol filed a properly supported summary disposition motion addressing whether Brown sustained a serious impairment of body function, Brown had no duty to respond. Accordingly, the circuit court erred by granting summary disposition of the third-party claim."
