Michigan Supreme Court; Docket No. 104194; Published
Opinion by Justice Riley; Unanimous (with Justice Cavanagh Concurring in the result)
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 454 Mich 626; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Exclusion for Vehicles Considered Parked [§3106(1)]
Exception for Entering Into or Alighting From [§3106(1)(c)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous Opinion by Justice Riley, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and awarded no-fault PIP benefits under the parked vehicle provisions of §3106(1 )(c) to a plaintiff who slipped and fell on ice while entering her parked vehicle. It was undisputed that the plaintiff injured herself after she had opened the driver's door, had placed her right foot on the driver's side floorboard, and was shifting her weight to her left leg when she lost her footing and fell. Her left hand was gripping the inside door closure of the car during the fall. Plaintiff sustained her injury while attempting to enter the vehicle for purposes of driving away. Under these facts, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs injury was compensable under §3106(lXc), which extends coverage to those who are injured while "occupying, entering into or alighting from a vehicle."
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court cited its earlier opinion in Winter v ACIA [Item No. 1293] for the proposition that once a motor vehicle is deemed to be "parked," the determination of whether the injury is compensable is governed by the provisions of §3106(1) and that "there is no need for an additional determination of whether the injury is covered under subsection 3105(1)." Nevertheless, the injury must arise out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a parked vehicle "as a motor vehicle " and the injury must have a causal relationship to the parked vehicle that is more than incidental or fortuitous. This thought was expressed by the court in the following language:
"In summary, where a claimant suffers an injury in an event related to a parked motor vehicle, he must establish that the injury arose out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of the parked vehicle by establishing that he falls into one of the three exceptions to the parking exclusion in subsection 3106(1). In doing so under §3106, he must demonstrate that (1) his conduct fits one of the three exceptions to subsection 3106(2); (2) the injury arose out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of the parked vehicle as a motor vehicle; and (3) the injury had a causal relationship to the parked motor vehicle that is more than incidental, fortuitous, or but for."
The court further went on to expressly overrule an old Court of Appeals decision in McPherson v Auto-Owners [Item No. 179], which awarded no-fault benefits to a plaintiff who fell while walking around a parked vehicle. In McPherson, the Court of Appeals did not require a separate showing of causal connection, but required merely that the vehicle provide "the occasion for the injury."
Based upon the undisputed facts in this case, the Supreme Court found little difficulty in awarding benefits under §3106(1) (c). In this regard, the court stated:
"Plaintiff has established as a matter of law that her injury arose out of her use of the parked motor vehicle under §3106 because there is no dispute that (I) she was injured while entering the parked motor vehicle under subsection 3106(l)(c), (2) her injury was related to her use of the motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, i.e., she was going to be driving the automobile when she entered it, and (3) there was a sufficient causal connection between her injury and the use of her parked vehicle. "
The Supreme Court also affirmed some longstanding rules with regard to procedure in these cases. The court held that where there is no dispute about the facts, the issue of whether an injury arose out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle is a legal issue for the court to resolve, not a factual issue for the jury. In support of this proposition, the court cited Krueger v Lumberman's Mutual [Item No. 493] and Wills v State Farm [Item No. 1462]. The Supreme Court also stated that in making these rulings, the courts should keep in mind that the no-fault statute "is remedial in nature and is to liberally construed in favor of the persons who are intended to be benefited from it.”
Justice Cavanagh concurred in the result only.
