Michigan Supreme Court; Docket No. 109992; Published
Per Curiam; Unanimous
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 459 Mich 9; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Not Applicable
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Motor Vehicle Code (Civil Liability of Owner) (MCL 257.401)
Leased / Rented Vehicles
Private Contract (Meaning and Intent)
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous per curiam Opinion, the Supreme Court held that where a rental car was being driven by a 21-year old in violation of the clear and unequivocal language in a car rental agreement prohibiting operation of the vehicle by drivers under the age of 25, such language was sufficient to overcome the common law presumption that the motor vehicle is being driven with the knowledge and consent of the owner. It should be noted that this case was decided prior to amendments to the owner liability statute, MCLA 257.401(1); MSA 9.2101(1), effective June 22, 1995, which added specific provisions which limit the liability of a vehicle lessor to circumstances only in which the injury occurred while the leased motor vehicle was being operated by an authorized driver under the lease agreement, or by specified family members.
In this case, Avis rented an automobile to Virdell Hill pursuant to a written rental contract written in plain English. The language of the contract prohibited the vehicle to be driven by anyone under the age of 25. Several days later, the car was involved in a motor vehicle accident, while being driven by a 21 year old. There were no facts in the record showing how the 21-year-old came to possess the vehicle. The injured parties brought action against Avis under the owner liability statute, MCLA 257.401(1), et seq. That statute makes the owner of a motor vehicle liable for the negligent operation of the vehicle. The statute provides that the owner is not liable unless the vehicle is being driven with his or her implied consent. The statute establishes that the motor vehicle is being driven with the knowledge and consent of the owner if driven by specified family members.
The Supreme Court, in tracing the history of Michigan case law interpreting the owner liability statute, noted that under Roberts v Posey, 386 Mich 656; 194 NW2d 310 (1972), the owner liability statute absolves the owner from liability only when the vehicle is being driven without his express or implied consent or knowledge. The issue of consent or knowledge refers to the “fact of the driving," not to the "purpose of the driving, the place of the driving, or to the time of the driving." Subsequently, in Cowan v Strecker, 394 Mich 110; 229 NW2d 302 (1975), the Michigan Supreme Court held that the owner of a vehicle is liable once keys to the vehicle have been turned over to another, notwithstanding any specific limitations imposed by the owner on use of that vehicle. Subsequently, in Fout v Dietz, 401 Mich 403; 258 NW2d 53 (1977), the Supreme Court held that in cases involving operation of a motor vehicle by one who is not a member of the family of the owner gives rise to a "rebuttable common law presumption" that the operator was driving the vehicle with the express or implied consent of the owner.
In the instant case, the Supreme Court found that the written rental agreement between Avis and Virdell Hill was sufficient “positive, unequivocal, strong and credible evidence" that Avis did not consent to the driving of its car by a person under the age of 25, so as to overcome the presumption of consent. The Supreme Court stated that since the plain English contract was "clear and unequivocal, and there is no evidence in the record that would challenge the validity or applicability of the relevant contractual provision," the common law presumption of consent had been overcome. The Supreme Court decision in this case overrules Bieszck v Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., 224 Mich App 295 (1997).