Bay County Circuit Court; Docket No. 97-3678-NI-S; Unpublished
Honorable Kenneth W. Schmidt
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Definition of Owner [§3101(2)(h)]
Disqualification for Uninsured Owners or Registrants of Involved Motor Vehicles or Motorcycles [§3113(b)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this 21-page Opinion and Order, Judge Schmidt analyzed the definition of "owner" as used in section 3101(2)(g)(i), which holds that an owner is "a person renting a motor vehicle or having the use thereof, under a lease or otherwise, for a period that is greater than 30 days." The question in this case was whether plaintiff Genow was an "owner" of the uninsured vehicle involved in his injury, thus precluding him from recovering no-fault PIP benefits pursuant to the provisions of MCLA 500.3113(b).
In determining whether a person is a "owner" under this section, Judge Schmidt held that the relevant focus is whether the alleged "owner" has a "right to use the motor vehicle for a period greater than 30 days." The focus is not on whether the alleged owner actually used the vehicle for more than 30 days, but rather the right to use existed for a period longer than 30 days. In this regard, Judge Schmidt held:
"... The legislature has defined 'owner' for purposes of the No-Fault Act [as]... 'a person renting a motor vehicle or having the use thereof, under a lease or otherwise, for a period that is greater than 30 days."... This definition is clear and unambiguous. From a plain meaning of the words chosen, it is evident that... a person need not possess or use a motor vehicle for a period greater than 30 days in order to be an 'owner' of the motor vehicle for purposes of the No-Fault Act. Rather, the statutory definition just quoted requires only that, to be an 'owner' of a motor vehicle, a person must have the right to use the motor vehicle for a period greater than 30 days.... If a person has a right, under a lease agreement or otherwise, to use a vehicle for 90 days (as, for example, a college student borrowing an uncle's car to commute to a summer job), the fact that such a person sustains accidental body injury during the first 30 days in which that right exists does not negate the fact that the person was using (or 'having the use' of) the motor vehicle for a period greater than 30 days. It simply means that the injury occurred sooner, rather than later, during the period of permitted use. Again, whether such a person is an 'owner' under the definition stated in section 310J(2)(g)(i) depends on whether the person has the right to use the motor vehicle for more than 30 days. "
In this case, the court found that summary disposition was inappropriate because "whether Genow's alleged 'right to use' extended for more than 30 days, on the record before this court, is a genuine issue of material fact which precludes a grant of summary disposition in favor of any party with respect to grounds dependent on resolution of that issue."
In the case at bar, plaintiff Genow was injured while occupying a vehicle owned by Maylee Birch and her ex-husband. Ms. Birch had entered into an agreement with plaintiff Genow that he could use the vehicle if he fixed it up, put license plates on it, and purchased insurance for it. However, under the agreement, Genow would have to ask permission to use the vehicle. Plaintiff Genow performed the necessary mechanical work, and license plates were in fact placed on the vehicle. However, insurance was never purchased. Less than 30 days later, plaintiff Genow sustained injury while riding as a passenger in the vehicle, as it was being driven by Genow's girlfriend. The girlfriend was insured by Citizens Insurance Company who moved for summary disposition, which was denied by Judge Schmidt pursuant to the analysis set forth above.
