Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 203218; Unpublished
Judges Markey, Sawyer, and Whitbeck; 2-1 (with Judge Markey Dissenting); Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Entitlement to PIP Benefits: Arising Out of / Causation Requirement [§3105(1)]
Aggravation of Preexisting Conditions [§3105(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this 2-1 per curiam unpublished Opinion, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiff had not submitted sufficient evidence to establish medical cause in fact that his pre-existing brain tumor had been caused to become symptomatic resulting in the precipitation or acceleration of symptoms as a consequence of the motor vehicle accident.
Plaintiff was involved in a 1992 accident for which he sought treatment for neck strain and received a cervical collar. He missed two (2) days of work. Shortly thereafter, however, he began to experience headaches and neck pain for which he sought treatment, including physical therapy, and ultimately, over the next 21 months, his symptoms increased, including nausea, severe headaches, dizziness and double vision. In 1994, plaintiff lost consciousness four or five times and was ultimately diagnosed as suffering from a meningioma brain tumor. His doctor removed the tumor and testified that it was “quite likely” that the tumor had pre-existed the 1992 automobile accident. Plaintiff’s doctor further testified, however, that the accident “could have precipitated or accelerated the symptoms of the tumor.” Defendant's expert testified that the accident could not cause the tumor and that there was no medical evidence to support the theory that trauma from an accident could cause the growth or acceleration of a tumor.
The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff had the obligation to establish both cause in fact and proximate cause. The court held that a “mere possibility of such causation is not enough” and that when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, then the defendant is entitled to directed verdict. Plaintiff’s physician testified that although the accident could not activate a tumor or cause it to grow, it was likely that the accident precipitated or triggered the symptoms of the tumor. The Court of Appeals held that this evidence, at best, established that the accident “may have precipitated” plaintiff’s symptoms. The court held that the probabilities as to causation were “evenly balanced in this case” at best, and therefore, defendant was entitled to directed verdict.
Judge Markey, in her dissent, would hold that testimony that the accident "may have precipitated" or "triggered" plaintiff’s symptoms, was sufficient causing fact and proximate cause to defeat a motion for directed verdict.
