Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 204169; Unpublished
Judges Talbot, Neff, and Smolenski; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Work Loss Benefits: Calculation of Benefits [§3107(1)(b)]
Reasonable Proof Requirement [§3142(1)]
12% Interest Penalty on Overdue Benefits – Nature And Scope [§3142(2), (3)]
Requirement That Benefits Were Unreasonably Delayed or Denied [§3148(1)]
Conduct Establishing Unreasonable Delay or Denial [§3148]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Revised Judicature Act – Miscellaneous Provisions
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous per curiam unpublished Opinion, the Court of Appeals addressed issues of interest, attorney fees and the district court jurisdictional limits in connection with plaintiff’s claim for work loss benefits on remand from the prior decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in Marquis v Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, 444 Mich 638 (1994).
In this case, the Supreme Court in the prior decision held that plaintiff was entitled to differential benefits during the time that she worked at a construction company, but held that a determination of benefits beyond the time that she worked at the construction company would have to await a decision concerning plaintiff’s obligation to mitigate damages. Based upon this prior Supreme Court decision, the Court of Appeals in this case held that plaintiff, without question, was entitled to wage loss benefits consisting of the differential between her prior employment and the time that she worked at the construction company. Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that Hartford's failure to pay these benefits resulted in plaintiff’s entitlement to 12% interest under section 3142 of the No-Fault Act. Regarding other wage loss benefits claimed on remand, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiff did not provide the “reasonable proof” necessary to support the remainder of her claim until sometime during the trial in November, 1995. Therefore, the case needed to be remanded for further consideration of plaintiff s claim for interest on such benefits.
The Court of Appeals also upheld the district court's determination to reduce the jury verdict of $16,575 to the $10,000 jurisdictional limit set forth in MCLA 600.8301 for district court. The court pointed out that the provisions of MCR 4.002(B) permit a transfer of an action to the circuit court where a party realizes, after filing a claim, that the relief requested may be beyond the jurisdiction of the district court. Here, plaintiff could have but did not move to transfer the action to the circuit court, when it became possible that her award could exceed the district court's $10,000 jurisdictional limit.
The Court of Appeals also ruled on plaintiff’s claim of entitlement to actual attorney fees under section 3148(1). Given the fact that the prior Supreme Court decision had clearly ruled that plaintiff was entitled to differential benefits for the time she was employed at the construction company, and given the fact that the prior court decision was quite clear in stating what was due plaintiff and what yet needed to be determined, the plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees for Hartford's failure to pay the clearly owed benefits. Regarding other benefits that were the subject of further determination, the court held that a decision regarding attorney fees on such benefits was subject to determination as to whether Hartford unreasonably delayed in paying such benefits, and the matter was remanded for further consideration of this issue. Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the judgment in this case was subject to a 12% interest rate pursuant to MCLA 600.6013(5). Pursuant to the Supreme Court decision in Yaldo v North Pointe Insurance Company, 457 Mich 341 (1998), for complaints filed on or after January 1, 1987, if a judgment is rendered on a written instrument, interest shall be calculated from the date of filing the complaint to the date of satisfaction of the judgment at the rate of 12% per year, compounded annually. Thus, in this case, the interest should have been at the statutory rate of 12%.
