Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 201739; Published
Judges Hoekstra, Cavanagh, and O'Connell; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 233 Mich App 685; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Disqualification for Uninsured Owners or Registrants of Involved Motor Vehicles or Motorcycles [§3113(b)]
Definition of Owner [§3101(2)(h)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Intervention by Service Providers and Third Party Payors in PIP Claims
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous per curiam published Opinion by Judge O'Connell, the Court of Appeals held that incidental usage of a motor vehicle under the direction or with the permission of another may not rise to the level of ownership of an uninsured motor vehicle such as to preclude coverage for personal injury protection benefits under the provisions of section 3113(b) which would prevent the owner of an uninsured motor vehicle from being entitled to personal protection insurance benefits for bodily injury from an accident involving that vehicle.
In this case, Robert Ardt received severe injuries from an accident that occurred while he was driving a pickup truck. Plaintiff Rita Ardt, Robert's mother, was the title owner of the truck. She also owned a 1987 Ford Escort which was insured through Rita's policy with Titan. However, the pickup truck involved in the accident was not insured at all.
Titan denied claims for personal injury protection benefits on the basis that Robert was the "owner" of the uninsured truck involved in the accident and was therefore precluded from no-fault benefits by the provisions of section 3113(b) which provides that an owner of an uninsured motor vehicle is not entitled to personal protection insurance benefits for bodily injury resulting from an accident involving that vehicle. The term owner is statutorily defined to include "a person renting a motor vehicle or having the use thereof, under a lease or otherwise, for a period that is greater than 30 days." MCLA 500.3101(2)(h)(i).
Titan offered testimony from a witness indicating that Robert was a regular driver of the truck for longer than 30 days. Robert's mother testified that Robert drove the car only a few times, normally for such minor purposes as having it washed, although his driving of the vehicle occurred over the space of more than 30 days. The issue raised on appeal was whether or not these facts were such that a genuine issue existed, thus precluding summary disposition in favor of titan with regard to the issue of ownership.
The court noted that the statutory provision here operates to prevent users of motor vehicles from obtaining the benefits of personal protection insurance without carrying their own insurance through the expedient of keeping title to their vehicles in the names of family members. The court held that the term "having the use of " a motor vehicle for purposes of defining "owner" under 3101(2)(g)(i), means using the vehicle "in ways that comport with concepts of ownership."
Further, the court stated:
The provision does not equate ownership with any and all uses for 30 days, but rather equates ownership with "having the use of a vehicle for that period."
The court also noted that the term “having the use of" appears in tandem with references to renting or leasing. These indications imply that ownership follows from "proprietary or possessory usage" as opposed to "merely incidental usage under the direction or with the permission of another."
The court held that the "spotty and exceptional" pattern of Robert's usage to which was testified by his mother, may not be sufficient to render Robert an owner of the truck. Therefore, there was a genuine issue of material fact for resolution at trial, and summary disposition in favor of Titan was inappropriate.
In so ruling, the Court of Appeals rejected plaintiff’s statutory interpretation argument that the use of the term "the owner" indicated a legislative intention to exclude only the primary owner. In rejecting this argument, the court stated that where an uninsured motor vehicle involved in an accident has more than one owner, all the owners come under the statutory exclusion for personal protection benefits.
Finally, the court held that summary disposition was improperly granted in favor of Titan against co-plaintiffs Rainbow Rehabilitation Center, New Start, Inc. and Broe Rehabilitation Services, who claimed a contractual agreement pursuant to the doctrine of promissory estoppel in which the defendant, Titan, had promised to pay the benefits. In reversing the summary disposition granting in favor of Titan, the court held that reasonable minds could interpret Titan's assurances of payment pending completion of certain formalities as sufficient basis for establishing an agreement pursuant to the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
Therefore, summary disposition on this issue in favor of Titan was inappropriate.
