Michigan Supreme Court; Docket No. 113667; Published
Per Curiam Opinion; 5-2 (with Justices Cavanagh and Kelly dissenting)
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 461 Mich 382; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Limitations Period for PPI Claims [§3145(2)]
Tolling of Limitations for Estoppel [§3145]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Legislative Purpose and Intent
CASE SUMMARY:
In this per curiam Opinion, Justices Cavanagh and Kelly dissenting, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals [232 Mich App 656 (1998)] [Item No. 2024], holding that there was no "judicial tolling" of the one year period of limitation on property damage claims under section 3145(2). The court held the statute was not tolled by plaintiff’s notice of claim and the parties' pending negotiations.
Secura insured a home that was damaged by fire as a result of a power surge caused by electric lines that fell on the home's service line when a motorist insured by Auto-Owners struck a utility pole. The accident occurred on March 2, 1996, and the complaint for damages was not filed until 13 months after the accident, on April 1, 1997.
Secura submitted notice of claim on May 3, 1996. Auto-Owners acknowledged the notice, but raised questions concerning the claim. In a February, 1997 telephone conversation, an Auto-Owners adjuster told Secura's adjuster that Secura should file a lawsuit for the claim. The lawsuit was not filed until after the one year statute of limitations contained in section 3145(2) of the No-Fault Act.
In upholding the Court of Appeals finding that there was no judicial tolling of the statute of limitations, the Supreme Court resolved the question that had divided previous Court of Appeals panels, Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Company v State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, 123 Mich App 416; 333 NW2d 303 (1983) [Item No. 658], which concluded that such judicial tolling was available, and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company v Amerisure Insurance Company, 195 Mich App 1; 489 NW2d 115 (1992) [Item No. 2014], which held that judicial tolling was not available under section 3145(2).
In so holding, the Supreme Court distinguished the tolling allowed under section 3145(1), which the Supreme Court determined in Lewis v DAIIE, 426 Mich 93; 393 NW2d 167 (1986) [Item No. 936], allowed for the judicial tolling of the statute of limitations applicable to personal protection insurance claims. The majority held that the statutory provisions of section 3145(1) were found in Lewis, supra, to have evidenced a legislative intent that the one year limitation period would be suspended by the giving of notice. Conversely, the property protection benefit provisions of section 3145(2) are "starkly lacking" in any such qualification. The court held that the statute speaks for itself, and that there is no need for judicial construction.
In a footnote, the court further took note of the defendant's arguments that there are plausible reasons why the legislature would provide for tolling of personal protection insurance claims under subsection (1), but not for property damage claims. Those reasons include the fact that personal injury protection benefit claims may involve ongoing damages, which may not be entirely known within the first year. Property damages are more likely to be determined soon after the accident. Second, property protection insurance benefit claims are often between insurance companies, sophisticated parties aware of statutory limitation periods and there ramifications.
Having taken note of such policy reasons for the different treatment, the court, nevertheless, concluded that the language of the statute was clear, not requiring any further analysis. In his dissent, joined by Justice Kelly, Justice Cavanagh noted that in Lewis, supra, the Supreme Court had tolled a limitation provision in the same statute at issue as the instant case.
Justice Cavanagh points out that in Lewis, supra, the basis of the decision was not a difference in statutory language, but rather, was based upon preserving legislative purposes. Justice Cavanagh states that relying upon the restrictive language of the statute alone "turns a deaf ear to the analytical voice of this court." Further, he points out that the majority's interpretation actually encourages needless litigation, as a prudent policyholder must file suit within one year of the injury, regardless of whether the insurer is still processing the claim.
