Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 212177; Unpublished
Judges Kelly, Holbrook, Jr., and Griffin; 2-1 (with Judge Kelly Dissenting); Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
General Rule of Priority [§3114(1)]
Determination of Domicile [§3114(1)]
Exception to General Priority for Non-Occupants [§3115(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Private Contract (Meaning and Intent)
CASE SUMMARY:
In this 2-1 published Opinion by Judge Griffin, Judge Kelly dissenting, the Court of Appeals held that the priority rules of section 3114(1) required that a mentally retarded adult residing in a state licensed adult foster care facility operated by a non-profit corporation, was entitled to receive no-fault benefits from the insurance company for the non-profit corporation under the company's insurance policy definition of a "family member" which included a "ward or foster child."
At the time of the accident, Dennis Flynn was residing in a state licensed adult foster care facility operated by Paragon, a non-profit corporation, which was insured for no-fault automobile insurance by United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company (USF&G). Dennis Flynn was injured while walking across the road and struck by a car insured by defendant Citizens Insurance Company. Under the priority rules of the No-Fault Act, Flynn would be covered for no-fault insurance under section 3114(1) if he was the person named in the policy, the person's spouse, or a relative of either domiciled in the same household. Second in priority for no-fault benefits would be section 3115(1), requiring that coverage be provided by the insurer of the owner or registrant of the motor vehicle involved in the accident, i.e., Citizens.
USF&G argued in this case, however, that Flynn was not a "family member" or ward of the household of the named insured, Paragon, because Paragon is not an individual and a corporation cannot have a family member.
In affirming the trial court's decision that USF&G was the priority insurer for Flynn, the Court of Appeals relied upon the language of the USF&G policy which contained a broad definition of who is an insured under the policy. Under the language of the policy, the definition of insured included "family members" and the definition of family member included a "ward or foster child." The Court of Appeals relied upon the case of Hartman v Insurance Company of North America, 106 Mich App 731 (1981), which was decided on virtually identical facts, and found that the term "ward" should not be restricted in its definition to include only a person on behalf of whom a legal guardian has been appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction. The common and ordinary dictionary definition of "ward" is a "person under the protection or tutelage of a person."
Further, the Court of Appeals rejected USF&G's argument that because the adult foster home in Hartman was operated by individuals, while the home in the present case was operated by a corporation, the result should be different. Relying upon the opinion of the trial court, the Court of Appeals determined that because a corporation can sue in its own name, and be considered a person for purposes of suits, there is no reason why a corporation cannot have a "ward" within the meaning of the policy.
Judge Kelly dissented and would reverse. Judge Kelly noted that this is a case of first impression in Michigan, but several courts from other jurisdictions have ruled that an individual cannot recover as a "family member" including a "ward" under a policy of insurance issued to a corporation. On that basis, Hartman is distinguishable. Although the corporation provides services, Judge Kelly would hold that it cannot be interpreted as creating a "family relationship."