Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #304719; Published
Judges Jansen, Stephens, and Riordan; unanimous; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Forthcoming; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Allowable Expenses: Incurred Expense Requirement [§3107(1)(a)]
Allowable Expenses: Causation Requirement [§3107(1)(a)]
Allowable Expenses for Medical Transportation Mileage [§3107(1)(a)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
In this unanimous published per curiam Opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition on the issue of whether the transportation services plaintiff provided to an injured person’s non-medical, personal transportation needs could be claimed as an allowable expense benefit under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). The Court found that certain personal transportation services at issue were not directly related to the injured person’s medical treatment, but were solely to maintain his pre-injury quality of life. The Court also found that with respect to plaintiff’s waiting fees, the plaintiff was actually rendering services while waiting for the injured person at his medical appointment, because the plaintiff had to wait for the injured person, in order to drive the injured person back from the appointment. The Court further found that the plaintiff sought payment for mileage expenses for mile that were not actually driven and, therefore, could not be claimed as a no-fault benefit.
The services at issue in this case consisted of three components: (1) a pick-up fee of $35 to come and get the injured person; (2) a waiting fee of $30 per hour, billed in 15 minute increments, if the driver had to wait for the injured person; and (3) mileage. Plaintiff charged these fees for transportation services for the injured person’s medical treatment related to his motor vehicle accident injuries and for the injured person’s personal transportation needs unrelated to his injuries.
The trial court agreed with defendant that the transportation services rendered in relation to the injured person’s personal transportation needs were not compensable, because the services were not related to the injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation of the injuries he sustained in the motor vehicle accident. In affirming the trial court’s ruling on this issue, the Court of Appeals reasoned that these personal transportation services were not directly related to the injured person’s medical treatment, but were solely to maintain his pre-injury quality of life. Notably, the Court of Appeals reasoning was premised on the fact that the injured person’s doctor testified that the personal transportation services allowed the injured person to live the same normal lifestyle he lived before he was injured, “but it was ultimately up to the lawyers and the insurance company to determine what was compensable under the No-Fault Act.” In this regard, footnote 1 of the Court of Appeals Opinion specifically states:
The doctor wrote the prescription as dictated to him by Grinblatt “under the presumption that [it] would be submitted to the insurer and that [it] would be the insurer’s decision as to what was covered.” While the doctor testified that rehabilitation includes participation in social or recreational activities and “community reintegration,” the tenor of his testimony was that the social and community aspects of rehabilitation were necessary for a patient’s complete recovery in that they were part of a normal lifestyle but it was up to the lawyers and insurance companies to determine what was compensable under the no-fault act.
Therefore, because there was no direct evidence that the personal transportation needs were related to the care, recovery, or rehabilitation for the injuries the person sustained in the motor vehicle accident, the Court of Appeals found that the services constituted replacement services, rather than allowable expense services under MCL 500.3107(1)(a).
The trial court also agreed with defendant’s argument that the plaintiff could not claim allowable expense benefits for the charges incurred for the time spent waiting for the injured person at his medical appointments. Apparently, the trial court found that the plaintiff was not actually rendering any services during the time its driver was waiting for the injured person. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court on this issue, finding that the plaintiff would have to charge for such services, even though the injured person was not in the vehicle, because the plaintiff cannot transport him to and from medical appointments unless plaintiff first picks him up at home and then waits for him, or comes back to get him to take him back home again. The Court of Appeals ultimately found that because the pickup and wait time aspect of the plaintiff’s services were actually rendered and the fees were incurred, the only issue to decide on remand was whether those charges were reasonable.
Lastly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the defendant was not responsible to pay the plaintiff’s charges for mileage expenses that related to miles that the plaintiff did not actually drive. The basis for this ruling was simply that the defendant had no responsibility to pay for services that were not actually rendered to the injured person.
