Michigan Supreme Court; Docket No. #140401; Published
Justices Young, Zahra, Markman, and M.B. Kelly; 4-3 per curiam
Justice M. Kelly dissenting, joined by Justices Cavanagh and Hathaway;
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: ____ Mich ____ (2012); Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Not applicable
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Notice of Governmental Tort Claim Under MCL 124.419
In this 4-3 per curiam Opinion written by Chief Justice Young, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that plaintiff’s application for no-fault first-party PIP benefits submitted to defendant’s no-fault insurer, did not constitute adequate written notice of a third-party tort claim sufficient to comply with the third-party tort claim notice rules applicable to governmental transportation authorities pursuant to MCL 124.419. Under this statute, a third-party tort claim brought against a transportation authority in derogation of governmental immunity must be preceded by a written notice of claim served within 60 days of the occurrence resulting in the injury. The 60 day written notice limitation of MCL 124.419 applies to any ordinary claims brought against a transportation authority that arise out of injury to persons or property. This includes traditional tort claims arising out of occurrences involving a common carrier through which injury is sustained. A claim for no-fault PIP benefits brought under MCL 500.3101 is not a claim for purposes of MCL 124.419 because it is not a tort claim and it is not paid from the authority’s funds as traditional tort claims are, but is rather paid by a carrier’s no-fault insurer. The Court went on to hold that an application for no-fault benefits is distinctly different in nature from a claim for third-party tort damages. Therefore, notice of one does not serve as notice of the other. Moreover, no-fault first-party PIP benefits are recoverable without regard to fault, unlike tort liability.
The Court went on to note that the Court of Appeals committed error in holding that plaintiff’s no-fault PIP benefit application, coupled with her communications with defendant or defendant’s insurer regarding her medical condition, satisfied the 60-day notice requirement of MCL 124.419. In this regard, the Court held:
“The Court of Appeals compounded this error by importing concepts of substantial compliance and [defendant’s] institutional knowledge of the accident gleaned from other sources as sufficient to provide the notice required by MCL 124.419. The statute requires ‘written notice’ of ‘claims,’ which must be ‘served’ upon [defendant]. A ‘claim’ is ‘a demand for something as due; an assertion of a right or an alleged right.’ A claim is not merely an occurrence; it is a demand for payment pursuant to a legal right as a result of that occurrence. The statute does not permit knowledge of facts that could give rise to a claim, as the Court of Appeals held, but rather it requires written notice of the claim itself. Knowledge of operative facts is not equivalent to written notice of a claim.”
Justice Marilyn Kelly dissented, joined by Justices Cavanagh and Hathaway. The dissent contended that statutory notice requirements such as MCL 124.419 should only be enforceable to the extent that a defendant is prejudiced by plaintiff’s noncompliance. In this case, there was no actual prejudice, which is the primary purpose of the notice provision, because defendant had notice of the factual basis of plaintiff’s tort claim when she filed a claim for no-fault benefits with the defendant’s insurance carrier and defendant, through its carrier, also received plaintiff’s medical records as well as other reports regarding her condition. Therefore, the dissent contended that plaintiff had substantially complied with MCL 124.419 and accordingly, the defendant was not prejudiced.
