Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 305385; unpublished
Judges Talbot, Servitto, and Kelly; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Exception for Permanently Mounted Equipment Use [§3106(1)(b)]
Exception for Loading / Unloading [§3106(1)(b)]
Exception for Entering Into or Alighting From [§3106(1)(c)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam Opinion, the Court of Appeals held that “no exception to the exclusion of no-fault benefits for injuries arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a parked vehicle applied” and affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in defendant’s favor because it was undisputed that plaintiff “fell against the back of his car near the taillight” and, therefore, did not come into contact “with equipment permanently mounted on the vehicle.”
The plaintiff in this case was injured as he approached his parked vehicle. As he was walking toward the vehicle, he tripped on an uneven concrete slab, lunged forward, and hit his shoulder near the rear tail light of the vehicle. Following the accident, he sought to recover no-fault insurance benefits relying on the parked-vehicle exceptions provided for in MCL 500.3106(1)(b) and (c).
The Court noted that these exceptions apply provided that:
“(b) . . . the injury was a direct result of physical contact with equipment permanently mounted on the vehicle, while the equipment was being operated or used, or property being lifted onto or lowered from the vehicle in the loading or unloading process.
(c) . . . the injury was sustained by a person while occupying, entering into, or alighting from the vehicle.”
Noting that the operative facts in this case were undisputed, the Court of Appeals held that neither of these exceptions applied under the circumstances.
Relying in part on the recent case of Frazier v Allstate Ins Co, 490 Mich 381 (2011), the Court first found that subsection (1)(b) did not apply because “the constituent parts of ‘the vehicle’ itself are not ‘equipment.’” Further relying on the cases of Perez v Farmers Ins Exch, 225 Mich App 731 (1997), and Arnold v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 84 Mich App 75 (1978), the Court also reasoned that “plaintiff’s injury was also not the direct result of physical contact with . . . property being lifted onto or lowered from the vehicle in the loading . . . process.” Finally, the Court further noted that “an injury that occurs while carrying a box to a vehicle is not a loading accident within the ambit of § 3106(1)(b),” thereby suggesting that the plaintiff had been doing so when he fell. However, the facts of the opinion are silent as to whether he actually was.
The Court found that subsection (1)(c) did not apply because “his injury was not sustained while occupying, entering into, or alighting from the vehicle. His injury occurred as he was approaching the car.”
Accordingly, based on the foregoing undisputed facts, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the applicability of the parked-vehicle exceptions set forth in § 500.3106.
