Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #301157; Unpublished
Judges Murphy, Stephens, and Rioridan; unanimous; per curiam;
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not applicable; Link to Opinion:, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Exception for Loading/Unloading [§3106(1)(b)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam Opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s Order granting summary disposition in favor of the defendant, Walter Sakowski, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Mary Jo McNamara, on the issue of whether MEEMIC Insurance Company was responsible to provide no-fault insurance benefits to McNamara for the serious injuries she sustained as a result of falling to the pavement outside of her car door after losing her balance in an unsuccessful attempt to stop a glass bottle of water from falling out of the car. In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals ultimately ruled that Ms. McNamara’s injuries were not the direct result of physical contact with property being lifted onto or lowered from the vehicle in the loading or unloading process, as required under MCL 500.3106(1)(b).
On the day Ms. McNamara was injured, after shopping with friends, she rode as a back seat passenger to a friend’s condominium. The car was parked and Ms. McNamara exited the vehicle. As she stood outside the vehicle, a glass bottle of water apparently began to fall out from the back seat of the vehicle. Ms. McNamara attempted to stop the bottle from falling to the pavement, and while doing so, she fell and sustained serious injuries. Her injuries were not the result of any contact with the glass bottle.
At the trial court, there were competing motions for summary disposition as to whether Ms. McNamara was entitled to claim no-fault benefits, pursuant to MCL 500.3106(1)(b). The specific issue was whether Ms. McNamara was entitled to claim no-fault benefits on the basis that her injuries were the direct result of physical contact with property, i.e., the water bottle, as it was being lowered from the car in the unloading process. The trial court ultimately ruled that pursuant to the Court of Appeals holding in Sherman v Mich Mut Ins Co, 124 Mich App 700 (1983), Ms. McNamara was entitled to no-fault benefits based on the factual circumstances of her injuries.
In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals noted that Sherman did not address whether, under MCL 500.3106(1)(b), a person was entitled to claim no-fault benefits for an injury sustained as a direct result of physical contact with property being lifted onto or lowered from the parked vehicle. Rather, Sherman addressed whether a person was entitled to claim no-fault benefits as an occupant of an unreasonably parked vehicle under MCL 500.3106(1)(c). Therefore, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court erred in reaching its holding based on Sherman.
The Court of Appeals recognized that based upon the Court of Appeals holding in Arnold v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 84 Mich App 75 (1978), the two clauses in MCL 500.3106(1)(b), i.e., the “equipment” and “property” clauses were independent, and, therefore, a person could claim no-fault benefits for “injuries which are a direct result of physical contact with property being lifted onto or lowered from the parked vehicle in the loading or unloading process.”
The Court of Appeals then addressed the following decisions that stand for the proposition that a person can only claim no-fault benefits in situations involving the loading or unloading of property when the person can demonstrate that the injuries directly resulted from physical contact with the actual property as it was being lifted onto or lowered into the vehicle during the loading or unloading process: Celina Mut Ins Co v Citizens Ins Co, 136 Mich App 315 (1984), Dembinski v Aetna Cas & Surety Co, 76 Mich App 181 (1977); Frohm v American Motorists Ins Co, 148 Mich App 308 (1985).
The Court of Appeals ultimately held in this case that Ms. McNamara was not entitled to claim no-fault benefits under MCL 500.3106(1)(b) because her injuries were not the direct result of her physical contact with the glass water bottle. Rather, she was hurt when she fell while attempting to gain physical contact with the falling glass water bottle. In this regard, the court stated:
“Here, the evidence indicates that it was the loss or lack of physical contact with the bottled water that set into motion the act of McNamara falling to the ground. McNamara’s physical contact with the bottle, in and of itself, did not cause or result in her injuries; she was apparently trying to gain physical contact or control when the fall occurred. Moreover, McNamara’s injuries were not the result of being struck by the bottle of water. The bottled water did not fall on her and cause her injuries. McNamara focuses on the fact that she was holding or had physical contact with the water bottle before she was injured, but physical contact with the property alone does not establish the applicability of §3106(1)(b). The injury must be the direct result of the person’s physical contact with the property, and such was simply not the case here relative to McNamara’s injuries and any physical contact with the bottled water. We also question whether it can be said that the water bottle was being “lowered” from the car as required by §3106(1)(b). The factual circumstances in this case, when viewed in a light most favorable to McNamara, do not support the conclusion that §3106(1)(b) was implicated.”
