Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 301980; Unpublished
Judges Servitto, Talbot, and K. F. Kelly; unanimous; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not applicable; Link to Opinion 
On January 18, 2013, the Michigan Supreme Court REVERSED this decision in lieu of granting leave to appeal; Link to Order
STATUTORY INDEXING:
General Rule of Priority 3114(1)
Other Misc. Rules of Priority
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous, unpublished per curiam Opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed a grant of partial summary disposition, which had been granted in favor of Michigan Insurance Company, and remanded for further proceedings in a case involving an issue of priority under 3114(1) for payment of first-party benefits.
Lawrence Stubbe was injured as a pedestrian struck by a vehicle insured by Michigan Insurance Company. Michigan paid PIP benefits but then sought declaratory judgment seeking an order determining National Liability & Fire Insurance should have paid those benefits because Stubbe was a "ward" of an adult foster care home where he was residing at the time of the injury. The adult foster care home owned a vehicle which was insured by National. Stubbe did not own a vehicle at the time of his injury.
Michigan Insurance Company contended Stubbe was a "ward" of the adult foster care home and, therefore, a "family member" within the meaning of National's automobile policy. The policy of insurance issued by National insuring a vehicle owned by the adult foster care facility defined an "insured" as "you or any family member." The term "family member" is further defined within the policy to include a "ward or foster child." In this case, the question concerned a factual issue as to whether or not Stubbe had the status of "ward" for purposes of the insurance policy definition. The "Court of Appeals in reversing the trial court's grant of summary disposition in favor of Michigan Insurance Company first noted that the general provisions of 3114(1) were not determinative because Stubbe was not a 'person named in the policy, the person's spouse, or a relative of either domiciled in the same household.'" However, the language of National's policy included the extension of PIP benefits to a broader range of individuals than stated in the statute, specifically including a "ward." The issue of whether Stubbe was a ward of the foster care facility was disputed. National argued that Stubbe was not a ward of the foster care facility because he required very little care or attention and was highly independent in his daily functioning and did not have a conservator or guardian appointed.
In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that the common or accepted definition of the term "ward" is an individual "under the protection or tutelage of a person" and that a corporation "such as the adult foster care facility" is capable of having a ward. However, in this case, the issue of whether Stubbe was a ward of the facility required a factual determination based upon the "type and extent of control that is exercised by the foster care home over an individual resident." The Court held that this issue was an issue of material fact therefore requiring reversal and remand for further proceedings.
