Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #299786; Unpublished
Judges Shapiro, Whitbeck, and Gleicher; unanimous; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
General Rule of Priority [§3114(1)]
Determination of Domicile [§3114(1)]
Exception for Occupants [§3114(4)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam Opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed a grant of summary disposition in favor of defendant Auto Club and granted summary disposition in favor of Great Lakes in a case concerning the issue of priority of coverage for PIP benefits which turned upon the issue of plaintiff's domicile.
Plaintiff Andrew Lucio turned 18 and decided to attend high school in Saginaw rather than in Frankenmuth where he resided with his mother and stepfather. He moved into the Saginaw home of Penny Maxwell. While staying with Maxwell and driving her car, Andrew sustained injuries in a motor vehicle accident. A claim was made for personal injury protection benefits. Great Lakes, the insurer of Penny Maxwell's vehicle denied coverage as did Auto Club, the insurer of Andrew's mother.
The court in determining this issue first looked to the provisions of §3114(1) which states that a PIP policy applies not only to the named insured, but also to a "relative domiciled in the same household." Only if the injured party is not a named insured and not domiciled in the same household as a relative named insured, would another insurer become liable under the alternative priority provisions of §3114(4).
The court noted that the determination of domicile is a question of fact to be resolved by the trial court. Further, domicile and residence in Michigan are generally synonymous terms.
The court cited the factors for consideration pursuant to Workman v DAIIE, 404 Mich 477 (1979), which include (1) the declared intent of the person, (2) the formality or informality of the relationship between a person and the members of the household, (3) whether the place where the person lives is in the same house, within the same curtilage or upon the same premises, (4) the existence of another place of lodging by the person alleging residence or domicile in the household.
Further, in cases involving "the realities of the young adulthood" which may involve different degrees of "separation of the parental home," the court noted that the geographical location of an impermanent place of lodging may not represent an intended domicile. In considering cases involving students, courts have considered additional pertinent factors, including:
(1) Whether the child continues to use the parent's home as the child's mailing address,
(2) Whether the child maintains some possessions with the parents,
(3) Whether the child uses the parent's address on the child's driver's license or other documents,
(4) Whether a room is maintained for the child at the parent's home,
(5) Whether the child is dependent upon the parents for support.
In this case, the trial judge entered an Order determining that Great Lakes, the insurer of Penny Maxwell, was obligated to pay the PIP benefits for Andrew. In doing so, the trial court relied heavily on the testimony of Andrew's stepfather who claimed that he had banished Andrew from the Frankenmuth home of the stepfather and Andrew's mother. On appeal, the Court of Appeals weighed the various factors outlined in its Opinion and noted that the record evidence undisputedly substantiated that Andrew and his mother both considered the Frankenmuth farmhouse his "domicile" and that Andrew intended to return to Frankenmuth after high school. Further, the court noted that Andrew lacked any formal relationship tethering him to the Maxwell home, maintained a Frankenmuth mailing address, deliberately and repeatedly identified Frankenmuth as his residence, kept most of his possessions in Frankenmuth, and remained dependent on his mother for essential aspects of support.
The Court of Appeals held that the pertinent facts objectively support Andrew's intention to remain domiciled in his parents' Frankenmuth household, and the testimony establishing these facts was undisputed.
Further, as an alternative basis for its ruling, the court held that the language of the Auto Club policy extended coverage to "resident relatives" of the named insured and defines a "resident relative" as "your unmarried child attending school away from home."
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary disposition in Auto Club's favor and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Great Lakes.
