Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 299559; Unpublished
Judges Whitbeck, Murray, and Donofrio; Unanimous, Per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Exception for Unreasonably Parked Vehicles [§3106(1)(a)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals held that a white van parked on a snow-covered road that blocked one-half of the southbound lane of a lightly-travelled residential road was not unreasonably parked under 500.3106(1)(a) because “drivers could react to and avoid the hazard it posed either by moving partially into the oncoming lane, if it was clear to do so, or by stopping behind the van until oncoming traffic cleared.”
In this case, the plaintiff collided with a parked van while he was operating a snowmobile with a malfunctioning headlight at approximately 2:00 a.m. while returning home. As a result of the accident, Plaintiff suffered numerous facial fractures, a shattered right femur, and a fractured clavicle. The plaintiff then sought no-fault PIP benefits from defendant Home Owners Insurance Company (HOIC), which insured the owner of the van.
Prior to the accident, the plaintiff was travelling across a frozen lake and hit a bump, which caused snowmobile’s headlight assembly fall out of its housing. He and his friend who was riding with him stopped and looked for the headlight, but they could not locate it and continued on without it. After eventually dropping his friend off at home, Plaintiff continued on to his own home. Along the way, he collided with the rear of the white van that was partially parked in the southbound lane of the two-lane street he was traveling on.
At the time of the accident, the van blocked approximately one-half of the southbound lane. The owner of the van had moved it onto the street after getting stuck in his driveway and, left the van parked along the street after having mechanical difficulties, for fear of becoming stuck in the driveway again. The responding police officer noted seeing the parked van from a distance of 310 feet as he approached the scene of the accident. Plaintiff’s blood alcohol level was 0.12 grams per 100 milliliters, and the investigating officer testified that from the degree of damage, the severity of plaintiff’s injuries, and the degree to which the impact had moved the van, he estimated that plaintiff travelled in excess of 25 miles per hour when the collision occurred, an estimate which plaintiff agreed with.
Based on the way the van was parked, Plaintiff filed suit seeking recovery of personal injury protection (PIP) insurance benefits under the No-Fault Act, and HOIC moved for summary disposition arguing that the van was not unreasonably parked in the road. The trial court agreed with HOIC and granted summary disposition in HOIC’s favor, reasoning that “had [Plaintiff] been acting as a reasonably prudent person, he would have had ample opportunity to observe, react to, and avoid the hazard posed by the van.”
The plaintiff appealed arguing that both that trial court erred in granting Home Owners summary disposition and also erred by considering his fault with regard to the collision itself. However, the Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition, concluding that “the van in this case did not pose an unreasonable risk of bodily injury” and that “the trial court did not erroneously consider evidence of [plaintiff’s] fault.”
In concluding that the van did not pose an unreasonable risk of bodily injury, the Court relied on the case of Stewart v State of Michigan, 471 Mich 692 (2004); RB No. 2477, where the Supreme Court held that a police cruiser parked in a travel lane was not unreasonably parked under 500.3106 when a motorcyclist collided with it because the motorcyclist had ample opportunity to avoid it. Quoting Stewart, the Court of Appeals explained that:
"MCL 600.3106(1)(a) ‘does not create a rule that whenever a motor vehicle is parked entirely or in part on a traveled portion of a road, the parked vehicle poses an unreasonable risk.’ Rather, ‘factors such as the manner, location, and fashion in which a vehicle is parked are material to determining whether the parked vehicle poses an unreasonable risk.’"
Based on these principles, the Court went on to find that the trial court did not err in finding that the van was not unreasonably parked because that like in Stewart, plaintiff here could have avoided the van here. In this regard, the court explained:
"Here, the parked van was more than 300 feet from the nearest cross street and impeded only one-half of one lane on a lightly travelled residential road with a speed limit of 25 miles per hour. The accident occurred in the early hours of the morning, unlike the accident in Stewart, but traffic was not as heavy as in Stewart. Similar to Stewart, approaching drivers had ample opportunity to observe the van. This supports a conclusion that drivers could react to and avoid the hazard it posed either by moving partially into the oncoming lane, if it was clear to do so, or by stopping behind the van until oncoming traffic cleared. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in concluding that the van in this case did not pose an unreasonable risk of the bodily injury."
With regard to the trial court’s consideration of plaintiff’s comparative fault, the Court found that it was not erroneous to consider that evidence, reasoning that since “the trial court based its holding on the manner, location, and fashion in which the van was parked. Any statement by the trial court regarding [plaintiff’s] actions served merely to summarize evidence or to explain why the accident took place despite the reasonable manner in which the owner parked the van.” Thus, it was not erroneous to consider the evidence of plaintiff’s fault.
