Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 298753; Unpublished
Judges Servitto, Markey, and K.F. Kelly; Unanimous, Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Entitlement to PIP Benefits: Transportational Function Requirement [§3105(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s orders granting summary disposition to defendant Pioneer State Mutual Insurance Company and defendant Acuity. on September 4, 2008, the plaintiff in this case, while in the course of his employment, was driving a truck with two trailers that were loaded with scrap metal. While traveling in the right lane of traffic, his vehicle was struck from behind by another truck. The plaintiff exited his vehicle to check on the driver of the other vehicle. After advising the other driver that he was going to call the police, the plaintiff took a few steps back towards his own vehicle. While outside the truck, the plaintiff was struck in the leg by a piece of metal that was propelled by a passing car and caused the plaintiff’s injuries.
The plaintiff initiated a declaratory action against Pioneer, the insurer of the plaintiff’s personal vehicle, and Acuity, the insurer for the plaintiff’s employer Warick Trucking Inc. Both defendants moved for summary disposition, arguing that the plaintiff’s injuries did not arise out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle under MCL 500.3105. The trial court agreed and granted the defendants’ motions.
In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals ultimately held that the trial court erroneously focused on whether plaintiff’s injuries arose from the vehicles involved in the collision, which were parked at the time of plaintiff’s injury, but failed to consider the involvement of the car that struck the debris that injured the plaintiff. In reaching its holding, the Court of Appeals recognized that under MCL 500.3105(1), an insurer is only liable to pay benefits “for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle . . .” The court further noted that under the Supreme Court’s holding in McKenzie v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 458 Mich 214 (1998), the injury must be closely related to the transportational function of automobiles. However, the court recognized that in Jones v Tronex Chem Corp, 129 Mich App 188 (1983), the Court of Appeals found that injuries that result from contact with material propelled by a moving vehicle sufficiently arose from the use of a motor vehicle in order to entitle a person to claim no-fault benefits. The Court of Appeals ultimately found that the plaintiff in this case was injured in a similar fashion as the plaintiff in Jones. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, found that the plaintiff was entitled to no-fault benefits and remanded for further proceedings. In this regard, the court specifically held:
“. . . plaintiff was injured because a moving motor vehicle set in motion an object that struck and injured him. His injuries, like those to the plaintiff in Jones arose from the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. Thus, the trial court erred in holding that plaintiff’s injuries did not arise from the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. Because the trial court granted summary disposition to defendants solely on that basis, we reverse its decisions and remand for further proceedings.”
